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THE GREEK WHITE BOOK

SUPPLEMENTARY

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

1913—1917

ISSUED BY

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

DEALING WITH THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY AND THE GERMANO-BULGARIAN INVASION OF MACEDONIA, AND CONTAINING TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BY THE ROYAL COURTS OF ATHENS AND BERLIN

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH EDITION BY

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AND

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The expense of this publication has been borne in part by Messrs. George D. Nicholas and P. Theophilopulos of New York

PUBLISHED FOR THE

AMERICAN HELLENIC SOCIETY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK

BY

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AMERICAN BRANCH

35 WEST 32ND STREET, NEW YORK

1919

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SUPPLEMENTARY DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1913-1917, ISSUED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT DEALING WITH THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY AND THE GERMANO-BULGARIAN INVASION OF MACEDONIA, AND CONTAINING TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BY THE COURTS OF ATHENS AND BERLIN.

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The present book completes the one that was published in the month of August. It is divided into two parts.

The first part contains the documents which have since then been deposited in the Chamber of Deputies, or transmitted to the Parliamentary Commission which was charged with the functions of Public Prosecutor before the High Court which was constituted for the trial of the Cabinets of Skouloudis and Lambros.

The second part contains the translations of a certain number of deciphered telegrams exchanged between the courts of Athens and Berlin, which have also been transmitted to the said Commission. These telegrams were written in cipher with a special code and transmitted either by wireless or by cable; in the latter case, the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne or again the Royal Legation at Rome transmitted them without knowing their contents. The details as to this correspondence are set forth in a letter to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and in a supplementary memorandum inserted at the beginning of the second part.

The present book contains, finally, six telegrams of the Ministers of Greece, at Sofia, Berlin, Vienna and Rome.

The words in brackets ([ ]) take the place of words which are illegible or missing in the telegraphic texts; the mention of "*illegible words,*" or the point of interrogation (?) indicate that it was impossible thus to complete the meaning.

The dates, unless there is a contrary indication, are those of the Julian Calendar. Those contained in the body of the telegrams exchanged between the Courts of Athens and Berlin, since it was impossible to verify them, form an exception to this rule and remain undefined.

PART I

No. 1

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *May 30/June 12, 1914.*

From my previous dispatches you have been kept in touch with the systematic persecutions to which Hellenism in Turkey has been subjected for several months. Tens of thousands of Greeks in Thrace have been forced to abandon their homes and to take refuge in Hellenic territory; during these last weeks, notwithstanding the repeated and solemn assurances given by the Ottoman Government to our Minister at Constantinople, and by the Imperial Legation at Athens, tens of thousands of Greeks in Asia Minor have been expelled from their homes and have taken refuge in the neighboring Greek islands; other tens of thousands are on the coast, deprived of everything and exposed to starvation, and are anxiously waiting, in order to save their lives, to embark on boats which we have sent to pick them up. Massacres of Greeks have been reported from Asia Minor; the anti-Hellenic boycott continues; treaties are trodden under foot, and the Turkish authorities participate in the excesses. Public opinion is justly excited to the highest pitch and demands energetic action.

The Government has given many proofs of its conciliatory disposition; in the question of the alleged ill-treatment of the Mussulmans in Macedonia, after numerous investigations, it has gone so far as to permit the Minister of Turkey to convince himself personally of the absolutely baseless nature of the accusations; in the question of the vexations and tortures of which the Turks were said to be the victims, it went so far as to accept an exchange of the Mussulman populations of Macedonia with the Greek populations of Thrace and Asia Minor, proving thereby the absence, on its part, of any aggressive tendency and of its sincere and friendly disposition; lastly, even in the question

of the Islands which have been ceded to Greece by the decision of Europe, it has never refused to take into consideration proposals which were made by Turkey with the intention of finding a proper ground for understanding in order to satisfy the *amour propre* of the Empire.

The situation having become intolerable, Greece could no longer remain indifferent; the systematic extermination of her compatriots cannot but become worse if she allows herself to become intimidated by incessant provocations. By the note of which you know, we have demanded the immediate cessation of the persecutions and the restoration of the refugees to their homes, stating that if satisfaction was not given, we would be obliged to send an ultimatum and to demand complete satisfaction; failing which we would be obliged to sever diplomatic relations and would not hold back before even extreme consequences.

Please bring what precedes to the knowledge of the Serbian Government in a confidential manner. We appeal to this friendly and allied Government in order to ask of it a benevolent attitude and its moral support. In case Bulgaria should participate in the war, or refuse to defend its neutrality, we would invoke the *casus fœderis*. For the present, Greece does not intend to mobilize its land forces, in the hope that the war will not go beyond naval operations. She will not do so unless Turkey concentrates her troops at Adrianople, in order to pass through Bulgaria, or Bulgaria mobilizes. Our action, being due to intolerable persecutions, has only in view the assurance of a durable peace and the *status quo* in the Balkans.

I beg you to telegraph to me the answer which shall be given you by the Serbian Government.

STREIT.

No. 2

Mr. J. Gennadius, Minister of Greece at London, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens.

(Telegram)

LONDON, *June 2/15, 1914.*

The Minister of Serbia has just told me that he has been ordered by his Government to indicate to the English Government that the

present crisis may bring (serious) complications by involving other States in the hostilities, if the Powers do not use their influence, especially at Constantinople, in order to calm the excitement and (to render) the situation more reassuring.

GENNADIUS.

No. 3

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens.

(Telegram)

BELGRADE, *June 3/16, 1914.*

The Minister of Serbia at Athens has just told me that he is leaving for Athens tomorrow and that he has been ordered to give to the Royal Government the reply of the Serbian Government.[1] He has left me a copy of his instructions which I hasten to transmit to you herewith by telegraph. I have remarked to Mr. Balougdjitch, in regard to the first paragraph of his instructions, that there has been omitted from it that in my communication to the Prime Minister, a qualifying phrase was used: "if no satisfaction was given we would be obliged to present an ultimatum, etc." (as is stated in your telegram of May 30th).[2] He answered me that they had in view (our) final resolution.

REPLY OF THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT TRANSMITTED TO THE HELLENIC GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE MINISTER OF SERBIA AT ATHENS:

"The Serbian Government has received the confidential communication which was made to it by His Excellency the Minister of Greece in the name of his Government, by which the Hellenic Government informs it, that if the Sublime Porte does not promptly put a stop to the persecutions of the Greeks, it will be obliged to sever its relations with Turkey and not to hold back before even extreme consequences.

"The Hellenic Government considers that the war will not go beyond naval operations and that in this case it expects a benevolent attitude and the moral support of Serbia.

"Still, the refusal of Bulgaria to declare her neutrality or her

[1] See document No. 1.
[2] See document No. 1.

armed intervention in the war will constitute for Serbia, according to the opinion of the Hellenic Government, the *casus fœderis.*

"In accord with these considerations, the Hellenic Government thinks that it is not absolutely necessary to order the mobilization of its army and that it would only decide to do so if Turkey should begin to concentrate her troops at Adrianople or Bulgaria should mobilize.

"This communication of such grave and unexpected decisions reaches us without any warning and without our previous consent.

"The Serbian Government considers it its first duty to fulfill all its obligations of ally, resulting from the Treaty of Alliance, which has a purely defensive character and the object of which is the consolidation of peace. It is, however, obliged to declare, from now on, that the question of the persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey has entered into a dangerous path without those peaceful means which are customary under similar circumstances having been exhausted.

"It is not possible for the Serbian Government, according to its appreciation of the political situation in Europe and in the Balkans, to consider as justified the opinion of the Hellenic Government 'that the operations will not be transferred to land.' As soon as the Turkish mobilization is decreed, and it will be decreed under the pressure of public opinion in Turkey, Bulgaria will also, on her side, mobilize under some pretext or other, either by invoking the case of legitimate defense, or by simply fulfilling an obligation due to an agreement which may have been entered into to this effect by her and Turkey.

"In this case Greece would mobilize her entire army, which, according to the opinion of the Hellenic Government, would constitute the *casus fœderis,* namely, the obligation for Serbia to proceed to mobilization in accordance with Article V. of the Military Convention.

"All these contingencies would inevitably arise as soon as the Turkish fleet should be attacked by the Greek fleet, because it is inadmissible to suppose that Turkey would voluntarily consent to be attacked by Greece there (on the sea) where it is more advantageous for the latter, and to abstain from operations there (on land) where she could have more chances of success. The mobilization of all these armies would inevitably bring on complications in the Balkans.

"Still, the fundamental duty of Serbia, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest, was the maintenance of peace in the Balkans, which, besides, is in accordance with the obligations undertaken by

Serbia by the treaty of defensive alliance concluded between her and Greece.

"The Serbian Government begs to express the desire that the question of the persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey may be settled peacefully through the intervention of the Great Powers, who have assumed the obligation of protecting the Christians in Turkey. Consequently, it desires that an armed conflict be avoided for the following reasons that are decisive according to its point of view.

"1st) The Serbian Government has not been able, up to the present time, to complete its armament, the larger part of which was rendered useless or was destroyed in the two wars. It is particularly in need of rifles and ammunition.

"2nd) Serbia also lacks financial means. Its finances are exhausted. All credit is refused to her and she cannot count on a loan abroad. During these last six months, she has made great efforts in order to secure a loan for a short term, agreeing even to issue Government Bonds, but to no purpose, inasmuch as she has already obtained one which, although now exhausted, has not been sufficient to meet her previous obligations.

"3rd) The Serbian people, and that means the army, is weakened and worn out; it is consequently unable to enter into a new war.

"4th) Bulgaria is at present better prepared for the war than she was when she attacked us. Austria has secretly supplied her, from her own depots, a sufficient quantity of new rifles and ammunition, and a large number of guns with the necessary ammunition. This makes one think that Bulgaria wishes war as soon as possible in order to take revenge for recent events.

"5th) Rumania has not consented to ally herself with us by a treaty and persists in advising us to try to influence Greece to take a resolution favorable to peace and for a pacific solution of her conflict with Turkey.

"6th) Our armed action would alienate from us the sympathies and the support of the Triple Entente, which are indispensable in order to maintain the situation created by the Treaty of Bucharest and (to neutralize) the contrary tendencies which aim at its revision.

"7th) Albania is in revolt and it is possible that the Mussulman insurrection may turn against the Greeks and Serbians at a time when we would be beginning the war against the Turks and the Bulgarians.

"8th) Finally, we would imperil and run the risk of losing the

important gains of the last two successful wars, for the sake of a matter which can be settled, at any rate temporarily, through the intervention of the Great Powers, meanwhile waiting for the favorable moment when we would be better prepared for the struggle.

"Consequently, the Serbian Government considers that it is its duty towards the country and her vital interests to draw the attention of its allies to all the serious dangers which would arise, as soon as Greece broke with Turkey and began a war by sea.

"I beg you, Mr. Minister, to acknowledge receipt of this reply of the Serbian Government as soon as it arrives, and to inform me of the further decisions of the Hellenic Government."

Mr. Balougdjitch has told me that the Serbian Government will ask the benevolence of the friendly Great Powers.

ALEXANDROPOULOS.

No. 4

Mr. D. Panas, Minister of Greece at Constantinople, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens.

(Telegram)

PERA, *June 4/17, 1914.*

The Chargé d'Affaires of Serbia yesterday communicated to the Grand Vizier the following:

"The Royal Government of Serbia, being animated by the most friendly sentiments towards Turkey, thinks it is its duty to call the most serious attention of the Imperial Ottoman Government to the events in Asia Minor and the persecutions to which the Greeks, who are Ottoman subjects, are there exposed. The Royal Government earnestly begs the Imperial Government to take at once the most severe and the most efficacious measures in order to put a stop immediately to this intolerable state of affairs.

"The Royal Government fears that this state of affairs, if it continues, may provoke at Athens and in Greece such a great excitement that the Hellenic Government may be forced to adopt measures and take steps which would render very difficult the maintenance of the excellent relations which fortunately exist between Serbia and Turkey, relations which it sincerely desires to continue and to develop."

The Grand Vizier, impressed by this declaration, replied to the

Chargé d'Affaires that he did not see how that which took place in Asia Minor touched Serbia. To the reply of the Chargé d'Affaires that whatever touched Greece touched also Serbia in her character of ally, the Grand Vizier gave a formal promise that in a few days order would be reëstablished, and added that he had the impression that Greece wished to go to war, which would be folly, inasmuch as we have two and a half million Greeks in Turkey who would thus be exposed to all persecutions.

PANAS.

No. 5

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *June 9/22, 1914.*

Please express to the Serbian Government the warm thanks of the Royal Government for the step which it has taken at Constantinople in regard to the persecutions carried on in Turkey, a step which has once more proved the strength of our alliance and the friendly bonds which unite the two peoples.

STREIT.

No. 6

A letter sent by Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Council of Ministers, to His Majesty the King.

(Letter)

ATHENS, *August 25/September 7, 1914.*

Sire:

In accordance with Your Majesty's order, Admiral Kerr has communicated to me the contents of a telegram prepared by him on the basis of the interview which he had with Your Majesty, in reply to the telegram of the British Admiralty.

I begged the Admiral not to send this telegram, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, until he had received new instructions from Your Majesty, and I hasten respectfully to submit my resignation in order

that the complete harmony that must exist between the Crown and the responsible Government during these most critical moments through which the nation is passing, may be restored.

After the declarations which I was authorized by Your Majesty to make to the representatives of the Entente Powers and the telegrams exchanged with the King of England by Your Majesty, I do not believe that to the new step of the British Government (Admiralty) Your Majesty will answer that Greece refuses to enter into war against Turkey until attacked by her.

As I had the honor of saying to Your Majesty, we certainly cannot undertake an offensive war against Turkey as long as we do not secure the coöperation of Bulgaria, or at least her absolute neutrality. But to declare that even on that basis we are not disposed to make war on Turkey as long as she does not attack us, is manifestly contrary to the well-understood interests of the nation.

We should not deceive ourselves. Turkey has for a long time been carrying on war against us without a declaration. After having refused to recognize the decision of the Powers as to the Islands, she has undertaken, and is continuing against Hellenism, the most furious persecutions to which it has ever been exposed. Two hundred and fifty thousand of our kindred have already been expelled from Turkey and their property, amounting in round numbers to 500,000,000 francs, has been, as they call it, confiscated. There is not the least doubt that Turkey, with the impudence which she derives from the unlimited support of Germany, will continue the persecution of the Hellenic element on a still larger scale. She will expel all the Greek population, consisting of several millions and will confiscate their property which amounts to many billions of francs. At the moment when we have the prospect of making war on Turkey with the aid of many and powerful Allies, shall we let this opportunity escape us, only to be compelled later to carry on this war alone, without allies or friends?

In participating in a war against Turkey as allies of England, France and Russia, under the above-mentioned condition of Bulgarian coöperation, or with assurances of her complete neutrality, we have no reason for, nor even any interest in declaring war against the Central Powers. But even if they do consider us as belligerents, all the probabilities that it is humanly possible for us to forecast conspire to prove that whatever may be the outcome of the war in

Central Europe, the local predominance in the East of the group to which England belongs will be complete.

By refusing on principle, and under any hypothesis whatsoever, our coöperation in the war against Turkey, we do not escape the war, we simply postpone it; and this for no long time. It is certain that Turkey will not demobilize until she has settled her accounts with us. Under these conditions our choice is strictly limited; we shall either be obliged to fight Turkey single-handed, in which case it will be impossible for us, even if we come out victors, to secure anything except the Islands, and to guarantee the future of Hellenism in Turkey, which will be exterminated even more ferociously after our eventual victory; or else we shall have to side strongly with the three Great Powers, when we shall bring about not only the return to their homes of the expelled Greeks, but also secure the final protection of the Greek element in Turkey, through the support that it will find in the future at the hands of the three Great Powers.

Thus the course that we ought to follow is already fixed. But that which, I think, confuses the issues and produces in Your Majesty's mind and in that of Mr. Streit, opinions contrary to mine, is the desire not to displease Germany through our coöperation against Turkey with the Powers that form the group opposed to the Central Powers.

And yet Your Majesty is certainly aware that last year, when I was traveling through Europe and the English Government declared that it was willing to impose upon Turkey the decision of the Powers concerning the Islands, even through the dispatch of an International fleet, if Germany would agree to this, the latter Power refused to coöperate and was the cause of the abandonment of the plan.

Your Majesty, I suppose, remembers also that later on, when the Powers of the Triple Entente decided to address to Turkey a strong note on the question of the Islands, Germany intervened in her behalf. And today it is Germany that furthers the plans of the Turks by giving them ships, money, arms, ammunition, and even officers. It is true that these preparations are particularly directed against Russia, but at the same time they are directed against us, since Germany, in order to compel us to violate our pledges to Serbia, threatens us openly with an attack in our rear by the Turks if we proceed to assist the Serbians in case of an attack by Bulgaria. And even if the Turkish forces are utilized against Russia only, and not against us, can anyone doubt that if Turkey finds herself among the

victors she will become so arrogant that she will be no longer satisfied with the destruction of the Greeks in Turkey, but, taking advantage of German support on the sea, will take away from us the Islands as well, at a time when we shall be without friends and without assistance. Besides, we know from the mouth of Count Quadt [1] himself that Germany, in accordance today with Austrian ideas, having discovered that the Bulgarians are Tartars and not Slavs, purposes, in case of final victory, to create a Great Bulgaria, extending as far as the Adriatic, in order to serve as a bulwark against Slavism.

Why, then, should we be so obliging toward a Power, which seeks by every means to help the two principal enemies of Hellenism, namely, the Bulgarians and Turks, and why show such indifference toward the Powers which after having created and under all circumstances protected Greece, are still disposed today to side with us?

Your Majesty, I am aware that the condition which I lay down for our military coöperation with the Entente in a war against Turkey, the condition, that is, of the coöperation or the assured neutrality of Bulgaria, is very difficult to realize. But this difficulty does not remove nor lessen the difference which developed at the very beginning between the ideas and tendencies of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the other members of the Government—views which, after the resignation of Mr. Streit and his temporary retention in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seem to have been changed into a difference in orientation between the Crown and the Government. In order to facilitate the reëstablishment of that harmony which is so necessary between the Crown and its responsible advisers, I have the honor to submit my resignation and I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Majesty the expression of my sentiments of unalterable devotion to the Throne.

ELEUTHERIOS K. VENIZELOS.

[1] The German Minister at Athens during the year 1914: *The Translators.*

No. 7

Memorandum of Mr. G. Streit on the probable results of the war.

(Translation)

ATHENS, *March 13/26, 1915.*

A. IN CASE OF THE VICTORY OF THE ENTENTE:

IF BULGARIA	IF GREECE	
I. Coöperates with the Entente	1st. Coöperates with the Entente	Bulgaria will obtain Serbian Macedonia, perhaps in its entirety, and the Enos-Midia line. Greece will obtain concessions in Asia Minor and a rectification of frontier in Macedonia (Ghevgheli).
	2nd. Remains neutral	Bulgaria will obtain the advantages indicated in No. 1. Greece will probably obtain a rectification of frontier in Macedonia, but at the same time, will run the risk of having to make concessions to Bulgaria.
II. Remains neutral	1st. Coöperates with the Entente	Bulgaria will obtain a part of Serbian Macedonia. Greece will obtain concessions in Asia Minor and probably a rectification of frontier in Macedonia.
	2nd. Remains neutral	Bulgaria will obtain a part of Serbian Macedonia. Greece will probably obtain a rectification of frontier in Macedonia.
III. Intervenes against the Entente	1st. Coöperates with the Entente	Bulgaria will obtain nothing. Greece will obtain concessions in Asia Minor and a rectification of frontier in Macedonia.
	2nd. Remains neutral	Bulgaria will obtain nothing. Greece will obtain a boundary rectification in Macedonia.

B. IN CASE OF VICTORY OF THE CENTRAL POWERS:

IF BULGARIA	IF GREECE	
I. Coöperates with the Entente	1st. Coöperates with the Entente	Bulgaria will restore Bulgarian Thrace. Greece will restore the Islands which are near the coast of Asia Minor and will run the risk of being obliged to make concessions to Turkey in Macedonia. (Autonomy of Macedonia.)
	2nd. Remains neutral	Bulgaria will restore Bulgarian Thrace. Greece will obtain Monastir with a considerable extent of territory.
II. Remains neutral	1st. Coöperates with the Entente	Bulgaria will obtain the whole of Serbian Macedonia. Greece will restore the Islands of the coast of Asia Minor and will make concessions in Macedonia.
	2nd. Remains neutral	Bulgaria will obtain Serbian Macedonia except Monastir. Greece will keep all that she possesses and will obtain Monastir.
III. Intervenes against the Entente	1st. Coöperates with the Entente	Bulgaria will obtain Serbian Macedonia, a part of Hellenic Macedonia and perhaps the Enos-Midia line. Greece will restore the Islands and will make concessions in Macedonia.
	2nd. Remains neutral	Bulgaria will obtain Serbian Macedonia and perhaps the Enos-Midia line. Greece will keep all that she possesses and will perhaps obtain a rectification of frontier in Macedonia.

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

I

(1) This table is limited to Greece and Bulgaria; but neither the attitude of Italy nor that of Rumania could be neglected in what concerns the results of the war, as these two Powers are bound to influence the issue of the struggle. Therefore, the above table is not sufficient for the appreciation in their entirety of the circumstances which may present themselves. I, however, think that the line of

conduct which would be followed by Italy and Rumania would have only a relative influence on the territorial rearrangements provided for in the table. At any rate, I am of opinion that useful elements of appreciation are herein contained.

(2) Likewise, the above table does not provide for the case, which is by no means impossible, of a *volte-face* in the course of the war by Turkey in favor of the Entente. In that case, the unfavorable consequences for us in what concerns the Islands near the coast of Asia Minor should be faced by us even in the event of a victory of the Entente, provided for in table A; at the same time, these consequences will cease to exist in the contrary contingency, provided for in table B. On the other hand, it goes without saying that, if such a sudden change in Turkish policy took place, Greece would have to renounce all the concessions in Asia Minor provided for in table A.

(3) The above table is based on the idea that the results of the struggle between the Great Powers will alone decide the territorial rearrangements that concern the secondary Allied States, independently of their success or their failure, which may possibly be contrary to the general results of the war. It is well understood that no account has been taken of the military questions concerning each group of belligerents, although they must be taken into consideration in order fully to appreciate the whole; I think, however, that the conclusions which I have reached in regard to the territorial arrangements will not be influenced by the military situation which will exist, according to the various contingencies, at the end of the war.

(4) The table presupposes that in the course of the war there will be no modifications in the constitution of the two groups of the Great Powers, particularly in consequence of the possible divergencies in point of view between England and Russia.

(5) If peace were concluded, not as the result of a decisive victory of one or the other of the belligerent groups, but in consequence of the exhaustion of the two groups, their forces remaining on the same footing of equality, the possible results provided for in the table would have to be reduced considerably, but their nature, I think, would not be modified.

II

In view of these facts, and relying on the data of the above table, I conclude:

(1) That the common neutrality of Greece and Bulgaria does not imply any danger; it will probably have as consequence a small territorial extension for the two countries, no matter what the issue of the struggle may be, but certainly a more considerable one for us, if the Central Powers are victorious. There seems to be so little probability that Greece will abandon her neutrality, if Bulgaria remains neutral, in view of the danger of exhaustion to which we would be exposed, at a time when the forces of Bulgaria would remain intact, that it is useless for us to concern ourselves particularly about this possibility.

(2) In the event of the participation of Bulgaria in the war on the side of the Central Powers:

(*a*) If we side with the Entente, we shall derive great advantages in case of the victory of the latter, but we shall also run great risks in case of the victory of the Central Powers, since Bulgaria, in the latter case, will become very dangerous.

(*b*) If we remain neutral, we shall in either case have certain small advantages but we shall also run the risk, in case of the victory of the Central Powers, of seeing Bulgaria aggrandized considerably.

(3) In the event of the coöperation of Bulgaria with the Entente:

(*a*) If we also coöperate with the Entente, it is true that a victory of the latter will open to us the largest horizons, but the Bulgarian strength will also increase in a manner dangerous to our territories in Europe. On the other hand, the defeat of the Entente will expose us to the very greatest dangers.

(*b*) If, on the contrary, we remain neutral, we shall run the risk, in case of the victory of the Entente, of seeing the Bulgarian power considerably increased, but not to our detriment; on the contrary, we have the prospect of a considerable increase of our power, in case of the victory of the Central Powers.

(4) Consequently, the simultaneous neutrality of Bulgaria and Greece is in every way advantageous up to a certain point; this in itself constitutes a guarantee, as long as the issue of the war remains uncertain. The neutrality of Greece alone, if Bulgaria intervenes, offers also advantages in any eventuality; but, at the same time, it prevents the danger of a disproportionate increase of the Bulgarian power, in case the belligerent group with which Bulgaria coöperates should triumph. But the danger of Bulgaria's increasing to an alarming degree exists in case,—with Bulgaria coöperating with the victorious Central Powers,—we should be found in the opposite camp.

This danger of a disproportionate increase of the Bulgarian power in relation to our European territories will still exist for us, even in case —with Greece coöperating with Bulgaria and the Entente,—the latter should triumph.

(5) It is for this reason that I hesitate to consider the intervention of Bulgaria in any eventuality whatsoever as being advantageous to Greece, and I would prefer, should the occasion present itself to us to intervene in the war, to see the three Balkan States, now neutral, coöperating and abandoning their neutrality simultaneously; for it is only then that it would be possible to count on any important results from their action—their forces not being mutually offset against each other—and to hope that their intervention would decide the issue of the general struggle, always provided that Italy did not align herself with the opposite side. Each of the three States would, in this case, have the right to demand compensations. There would be Transylvania for Rumania, part of Serbian Macedonia and the Enos-Midia line for Bulgaria, and for Greece, territorial concessions in Asia Minor and a rectification of frontier in Macedonia.

III

CONCLUSION

(1) I am of opinion that in any case it is not for us to draw the others on and that it is to our interest that Bulgaria should abandon her neutrality before we do so. Likewise, I do not call in question the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by us towards Serbia as against Bulgaria.

(2) Certainly Greece, after the recent events, would become involved in serious difficulties with the Entente, if she remained neutral up to the end; on the other hand, public opinion in our country has been excited to such a pitch by the arguments which have been presented, arguments the soundness of which it has been unable to verify, that it would be nearly impossible for us to remain neutral if Bulgaria entered into action.

(3) But the attitude of Bulgaria and Rumania (particularly the proposals to take the first step made by the former, and the declaration made by the latter, according to which she does not wish to have any Balkan difficulties but looks toward a common orientation and a continued contact with us), does not exclude, according to my view, the

possibility of a political agreement between them and ourselves, an agreement which would have as object, in the first place, a common neutrality and, in default of this, a simultaneous abandonment of neutrality in favor of the same group of belligerents, namely, the Entente, on whose side alone we can align ourselves. This agreement would, of course, have in view only the present circumstances and would leave out of account all the divergencies of view existing between the three states, as well as the particular tendencies of each of them. Such coöperation would justify our inaction in the eyes of the Entente, if we should remain neutral, just as it would justify our eventual coöperation with the Entente in the eyes of the Central Powers, inasmuch as Greece in either case would be following, as far as possible, a Balkan policy.

G. STREIT.

No. 8

Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris, to Mr. G. Christaki-Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, *February 26/March 11, 1915.*

I was today upon my return, received by Dr. Delcassé. He told me that the turn which affairs had taken in Greece had been a disappointment to the Triple Entente. Not only had France and England eagerly accepted the proposition which the Cabinet presided over by Mr. Venizelos had made, on condition of its approval by His Majesty the King, but Mr. Delcassé had telegraphed to St. Petersburg recommending its acceptance and had last Sunday received the adhesion, in principle, of the Russian Government to this proposition. The French Government had at the same time learned of the resignation of Mr. Venizelos, thus cutting short the parleys between the Triple Entente and Greece concerning our coöperation and the advantages which would result for our country.

ROMANOS.

No. 9

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *November 4/17, 1915.*

The Royal Government sees with distress that in the capitals of the Entente the semi-official press is endeavoring to alarm public opinion by giving credit to the apprehensions unjustly entertained by the Powers as to the real intentions of Greece. It regrets all the more this systematic campaign, which is surely inspired, because it had every reason to hope that the friendly explanations given to the representatives of the Entente would have dissipated every misunderstanding. In my repeated conversations with them, I have sufficiently clearly given them to understand that in no case would the Royal Government think of exercising the least pressure on the Allied troops, and that, if I mentioned the obligations of neutrality stipulated in the Hague Conventions, it was because such ought to be the official language of a country that is neutral and desires to remain so. But from the very first I have clearly indicated that there would be no question of actually applying the above regulations. In the event of the retreat of the Allied armies to our territory, the Royal Government could not adopt any other attitude than that which it had observed, to the satisfaction of all the belligerents, at the time of the first landing of the troops in Salonika, namely, that it would limit itself to a mere mention of principles without seeking to impose respect for them in any manner. And since the Allies make no distinction between their own troops and those of Serbia, the Royal Government also would not make any distinction between them.

The Powers cannot fail to take into account the very delicate situation in which Greece finds herself between the two groups of belligerents, and they ought fully to understand that the largest and most sincere benevolence has limits, beyond which the maintenance of neutrality becomes impossible, and that the country which desires to remain neutral should take great care not to pass these limits. As the Entente Powers do not deny and cannot deny to Greece the

absolute right to remain neutral, they ought, logically and in all fairness, to accept the consequences resulting from this and not to ask of her the impossible. Greece being neutral and wishing to remain so, could not speak officially as if she were not so and publish abroad the assurances which she has not ceased to give to the Entente Powers.

It is in this spirit that I have just spoken to Mr. Denys Cochin, who declared himself perfectly satisfied. The enthusiastic reception he has received, not only at Athens but at Patras, has furnished him, furthermore, the plainest proof of the real sentiments of the country toward France and her allies.

I beg you, without making a special object of it, to be guided by the above, in order, if necessary, to speak about it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, taking care to give to your conversation a strictly confidential character.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 10

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *November 13/26, 1915.*

Barely twenty-four hours after the delivery of the reply in which the Royal Government had given full satisfaction to the Powers, and as a result of which we had the right to expect a period of suspension in order to examine, with the necessary calmness, the last demands, the Ministers of the Entente expressed their desire to be received by me collectively as soon as possible. I received them early this morning and it is not without surprise that I took cognizance of their memorandum which is as follows:

"1. Retreat of the Greek troops from the city of Salonika and its environs.

"2. The free and total placing at our disposal of the railroads and of all the roads to the frontier, especially toward Krivolak and Monastir, so completely that we can take all the measures indispensable to our defense in the city as well as its vicinity, since the

establishment of a defensive organization around Salonika and before the Chalcidic Peninsula is of primary necessity in order to assure the security of the expeditionary forces.

"3. Freedom of the seas, including the right to visit ships and embarkations in the territorial waters; that of searching for and destroying enemy submarines and their bases of supply on the shores and in the territorial waters.

"Taking into account the difficult and exposed situation in which the retreat of the Serbian army toward Albania and Montenegro is going to place the Allied troops, it is extremely necessary that satisfaction should be given, not only by verbal assurances, but also by the taking of actual measures, such as the evacuation of the region of Salonika by the Greek troops, who are to be withdrawn in order not to be in a position to interfere with the liberty of our movements and defense."

As Mr. Guillemin told me that the French Government had taken the initiative in this serious and urgent step (an act which I regarded as quite natural, since the Allied contingents in Salonika are in large part French), I beg you to see Mr. Briand at once in order to make to him, as coming from me, in the most friendly and strictly confidential form, the following declaration:

"Before replying to the demands of the Powers, we desire to know surely what is the object of the requested measures. Have they in view the security of the retreat and the embarkation of the Allied troops, or indeed the establishment in Macedonia, and especially in Salonika, of a base of operations? In the first case, Greece would be willing to cover, even with her own troops, the movements of the retreat and the operations of the reëmbarkation of the Allied troops so as to guarantee to them an absolute security."

If Mr. Briand should be disposed to make known to you, confidentially, his intentions in this respect, you are authorized to give him, from me, the assurance on my honor that these confidences would be kept strictly secret and that every difficulty would be immediately eliminated, and every doubt dissipated.

I rely on your experience and your tact to give to this very delicate step the character of sincerity and moderation which is appropriate. You can explain that the Royal Government is animated by the most lively desire to facilitate the task of the French Government, but that it hopes in return that Mr. Briand will not lose sight of the

very difficult and very complicated situation in which we are placed and that he will not wish to increase our difficulties.

Please make known to me as soon as possible by telegram the result of your step.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 11

Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, *November 14/27, 1915.*

I have the honor to inform you that I have been received by Mr. Briand and that I have communicated to him the question put by Your Excellency in your telegram of yesterday.[1] He answered me that he could not give me precise information on this point. The only thing that preoccupies him at this moment is, that if the expeditionary forces fall back upon Salonika, they may be able to do so in full security. It is in order to insure this security that the conditions of the memorandum have been formulated; they originate in the very principles of the collective note to which the Hellenic Government has given its adherence. "When the Allied troops shall retire to Salonika, what will they do there? At the present time it is impossible to say." These are the very expressions of Mr. Briand, which I noted down at the end of our conversation. He added that "We will do all that we can in order not to place Greece in a difficult situation, but Greece in her present situation could speak a little loudly. She has her army concentrated on the Bulgarian frontiers, she could make her energetic words heard. Thus, in this state of affairs, we control the situation."

In reply to the observation of Your Excellency that a period of suspension would be necessary in order to examine calmly the last demands of the Powers, the President of the Council has told me that to his regret he was obliged to insist, in view of the march of events which rendered any delay impossible, that satisfaction be given at once.

ROMANOS.

[1] See document No. 10.

No. 12

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, Berlin and Vienna.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *November 27/December 10, 1915.*

The Ministers of the Entente came this evening and stated to me, in the name of their Governments, that the declarations made recently by His Majesty, the King, to the Minister of France, could serve as basis to an immediate agreement of such a nature as to respect our scruples and to insure the defense of their interests. After having discussed with them the various questions which are at issue in Salonika, we finally agreed upon the following:

(1) Salonika is not to be evacuated. The division stationed in that place at present will continue to remain there.

(2) If the railway staff be insufficient we could augment it so as to insure the maximum of efficiency, but we shall in no case accept foreign employees.

(3) If circumstances require, we will not oppose armed force to works of a defensive character or to the occupation of fortified points, but we shall not only protest formally, but most energetically and seriously.

(4) In case the Allied troops, in consequence of their movements, should bring the war into our territory, the Greek armies would stand aside, so as to leave both parties free to settle their conflict.

(5) We cannot accept any discussion in regard to Carabourou since the King has given his word that use shall never be made of this fortress or of the batteries placed in front of it, against the Allied forces.

The Ministers having asked me if, in order to facilitate matters, it would not be possible for the Royal Government to proceed spontaneously to the interruption of the repairs now going on, I replied that, without assuming any obligation with regard to this, I was of the opinion that it was not improbable that such a measure would be taken, particularly because of the lack of money.

(For Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd only:)

The Ministers declared that they were satisfied, but particularly so at the announcement that the Government had already ordered the 5th Army Corps to move more to the east, so as to leave all the space between Salonika and the frontier free. The Ministers of France and England have shown their satisfaction in a very marked manner and have declared, in agreement with their colleagues, that the decision taken constitutes a great concession on our part. I have taken advantage of this to express the hope that their Governments, being at last convinced of our good and sincere disposition, will not only hasten to abandon the coercive measures to which, without any plausible reason, they have again abruptly resorted, but will give satisfaction to those requests of the Royal Government which are of a financial and commercial character. They have promised me that every difficulty would disappear when, in two or three days, the military authorities shall have carried out the agreement entered into, and the Minister of France further called to mind the declaration of his Government that it would be happy to offer to Greece every facility, as soon as the difficulties which had arisen should be adjusted.

(For Berlin and Vienna only:)

I communicate to you the above for your own guidance and beg you to note that the Royal Government, in this new phase of its relations with the Entente, remains faithful to the line of conduct which it has outlined for itself from the beginning.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 13

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika, of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, and of the Fortresses of Salonika and Cavalla.

(Telegraphic Circular—Translation)

ATHENS, *January 26/February 8, 1916.*

To the questions put by the 3rd and 4th Army Corps I reply as follows:

In case strong German, German and Bulgarian or Bulgarian detachments, commanded by German officers, should present themselves on our frontier, demanding to cross it, our covering troops will not

oppose them, but will retire from the sector of the frontier which they occupy toward the bases of their companies or of their respective regiments or divisions. I communicate the above to you now in order to avoid any misunderstanding; besides, such an invasion does not as yet seem to be imminent. You will shortly receive detailed instructions about the movements as a whole, and about the disposition of our troops in Macedonia, as well as in regard to the strongholds where a halt might be made.

Likewise, if Anglo-French patrols persist in crossing the boundary, our covering troops will not oppose them, and, should an encounter take place, they will retire to a safe place, raising, if necessary, a white flag as a sign of neutrality.

These measures should be kept strictly secret.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 14

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika, and of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, to the Chief of the Gendarmery in Macedonia and to the Commanders of the Fortresses of Salonika and Cavalla.

(Telegraphic Circular—Translation)

ATHENS, *March 9/22, 1916.*

Following our telegraphic order, dated January 26 of the current year,[1] and in reply to the questions put by the 3rd and 4th Army Corps, we supplement this order as follows:

As soon as the detachments of foreign troops shall begin to penetrate our territory, in the circumstances provided for by our above-mentioned order, our scattered outposts should evacuate not only the invaded sector, but also the neighboring sectors, to such an extent that any encounter with the invading troops may be avoided, and sections of Greek troops may not be cut off from the base of their companies.

These outposts will have to concentrate promptly upon their company bases, taking with them their telephones and all other material which may happen to be on the frontier.

[1] See document No. 13.

As the penetration of the foreign troops continues, the companies stationed in the invaded zone should evacuate the places of their encampment, taking with them the material which is found there, and fall back upon the bases of their regiments. The same should be done by the companies stationed beyond this zone, in case they should be in danger of being cut off by the invasion. The regiments concentrated in their bases should be ready to march as soon as they receive orders from us. We cannot now give more detailed instructions, inasmuch as we cannot know beforehand through what point of our frontier the foreign troops will penetrate. It is, then, for the Commanders of the Army Corps or Divisions, as well as for the Commanders of troops on the frontier, to regulate, in case of necessity, this movement of withdrawal.

As far as we can judge the situation at present, the sectors which are susceptible of being invaded by foreign troops, appear to be (apart from the sector situated to the south of Doiran and Ghevgheli), the valley of the Strouma, between Beles and Tsingheli and the sector of Caradjova. As far as the valley of the Strouma is concerned, a first advance would attain, according to our suppositions, the south exit of the pass. Consequently, you should proceed in this case to evacuate the region comprised between Beles and Ali Boutous, to the right and left of the pass, our troops concentrating at Demir-Hissar and at Poroya. As for the Caradjova sector, the movements of the covering regiment have been well directed up to the present, and we have nothing to add.

To the question what should be done in case Bulgarian detachments appear alone without German officers at their head, we reply that judging from the manner in which the foreign troops are operating to the north of us, such a contingency is not to be expected, unless it is a matter of patrols, even of somewhat strong patrols; but these patrols will likewise be operating only as fractions dependent on a detachment which will also comprise German troops. If, however, contrary to every expectation, a strong and exclusively Bulgarian detachment should appear, ask immediately for orders from us, avoiding a conflict in every way.

In consequence of what precedes, the fortified works for which it may be necessary to give special instructions are those of Dova-Tepe, Roupel and of Phea-Petra (Croussovitico). When the foreign troops advance on that side, there should remain in the forts, as a garrison,

only a section of infantry with a small number of artillery and some engineers, under the orders of at least two officers knowing French; it would be very advantageous that at least one of them should know German, and that there should be soldiers in the force who know foreign languages, and particularly Bulgarian. The remainder of the garrison, with the Commandant of the fort, should retire, taking away with them all portable material and such parts of the cannons as would render them useless. The above instructions apply also to all the other fortified places, although it does not at present seem likely that such a contingency will present itself in their cases. As to the above-mentioned forts, their Commandants would do well to begin to make their preparations now.

The sections of the companies which remain in the forts will thus be isolated in the territories occupied by the foreign troops; their officers should enter into relations with the German officer commanding these troops for all the needs of their men, who must remain on post in the fort and not go out under any pretext; their mission will be to preserve and to guard the fort not against a hostile action, which is out of the question, but against any occupation which would take place if the fort were completely evacuated. They will likewise have the duty of representing Hellenic sovereignty in the territory which will be temporarily utilized by non-hostile foreign troops, in consequence of the presence, at Salonika, of other equally non-hostile foreign troops. It will then be a question of military honor for these small garrisons to prove their strict and blind discipline, their dignity, sobriety and orderliness. The relations of these garrisons to the foreign troops will be marked by reserve, but will at the same time be quite normal; their Commanders, by their conduct, should be able to avoid every (disagreeable) incident, to entertain cordial relations with the chiefs of the foreign troops and to obtain every necessary facility, such as the means of communicating from time to time with the Commander of the neighboring Greek division, through relations with the German commanders and with their permission, but never secretly. Such results will be attained if, on our part, we show our sincerity and entire good faith and if we avoid every imputation of espionage.

The gendarmery will maintain its positions; in case of need the gendarmes will concentrate in the interior of the forts.

All must understand that no matter how disagreeable their situa-

tion may appear to them, they must submit blindly to the will of the State, and understand that the higher interests of Greece depend on their complete submission to this will.

Any indiscretion as to the contents of the present order will greatly injure the supreme interests of the State.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 15

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika and of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla.

(Telegraphic Circular—Translation)

ATHENS, *March 20/April 2, 1916.*

By my orders dated January 26 and March 9 of the current year,[1] I have sent you instructions as to the manner in which our troops will conduct themselves in case of the entrance into our territory of troops of the Central Empires coming from the north, although such a contingency, as I have already stated in the first of these orders, does not seem to be imminent. The present order has as its object to prevent, between our troops on the frontier and the foreign troops operating in their vicinity, any [disagreeable] incident which might easily happen, particularly where the Anglo-French troops, by the advances which they are about to make or which they might possibly make in the future, might make of our frontier a battle-ground. Even some months ago, long before the operations in Macedonia took their present turn, a neutral zone was created, as you know, between us and the Bulgarians, in order to render impossible such incidents; but this neutral zone, for the above-mentioned reasons, was done away with at certain points. It is in order to prevent similar incidents, which may occur as a result of the present situation, that I issue the following order:

The general principle which should prevail on all the frontier is the following:

Our small posts ought to be from one to two kilometers distant from the opposite posts of the Central Empires and their allies, in such

[1] See documents Nos. 13 and 14.

a manner as to form between them and our troops a neutral zone of the width indicated above, in which neither any groups of our troops nor any single soldiers can penetrate; if, however, villages or any agglomerations whatever are found in this zone, the gendarmery should continue to stay there. Exception should be made to this rule in the case of the posts of Oxilar and Negotsani, where things shall remain as they are at present.

For the application of the said general principle, the following procedure shall be adopted: In regard to the sector which starts from the mouth of the Nestos up to Mt. Ali Boutous, inclusively, as well as that which starts from Mt. Ketchik-Aya, to Lake Prespa, things shall remain as they are, provided that nothing occurs to modify the neutral zone which was formed some months ago, by the reciprocal retirement of the Greek and Bulgarian troops; consequently, the distance as above fixed, ought, generally speaking, still to separate these troops; if, however, this distance has been shortened, care should be taken to reëstablish it. As for the sectors starting from Ali-Boutous to Seimen-Kayassi and from Lioumnitsa to Ketchik-Aya, the Germano-Bulgarians, in anticipation of a possible advance of the Anglo-French troops and particularly because the patrols of the latter had at times approached the boundary line, have had to suppress the neutral zone established on their side and to advance even to the frontier line, which they have even fortified at many points in order to hold their own against their enemies; thus, we are obliged not only to tolerate this situation but even to withdraw our posts to a distance of from one to two kilometers this side of the boundary line, for fear that they may be taken for Anglo-French troops, which might be approaching the frontier. The Germano-Bulgarians will therefore be able to establish themselves on this frontier line but without penetrating into our territory. They have been thus notified by us, but our posts in withdrawing should nevertheless notify them of this fact. In regard to the sector which extends from Seimen-Kayassi to Lioumnitsa, inclusive, inasmuch as it has become a battle-ground and the boundary line does not exist any more, we cannot give you detailed instructions. The posts which may perhaps still be found there should withdraw to a great distance from the fighting troops, carefully avoiding any contact with them. Exceptionally in Lioumnitsa, as far as circumstances permit, and in accord with the opinion of the Commander of the covering regiment, a detachment shall stay there to encourage the inhabi-

tants; but if its presence is likely to bring about a clash with either the one or the other of the belligerents, it, too, should withdraw.

You and your troops, particularly the covering troops, must have in view that we have made and are about to make strong representations in order to put an end to certain excesses of which the Bulgarians in particular have been guilty on our frontier. We are certain that these excesses have been committed contrary to the wishes of the respective Governments and in spite of the orders of the higher military authorities. The Governments and the Military Chiefs are exerting, as against this tendency, all their efforts to prevent every excuse for conflict with us; but there exist among our neighbors a good many subordinates who, acting on their own initiative, create incidents which must, however, under no circumstances provoke a general conflict.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 16

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika, of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, and of the Fortresses of Salonika and Cavalla.

(Telegraphic Circular—Translation)

ATHENS, *April 27/March 10, 1916.*

For the present, and until further notice, our order dated January 26th of the current year [1] is not in force. The same applies to that of March 9.[2] There remains in force only our order of March 20,[3] concerning which I give you the following explanations:

(1) As far as the sector of Ali-Boutous is concerned, the neutral zone, formed by the reciprocal withdrawal of Greek and Bulgarian troops from the frontier line, will be maintained from the mouth of the Nestos up to Height 1650 of Ali-Boutous, inclusive.

(2) In the sector situated between Ali-Boutous (Height 1650) and Seimen-Kayassi, these positions being not included, no encroachment on the frontier line will be tolerated. If the Germans or Bulgarians have occupied some points near the frontier line in order

[1] See document No. 13.
[2] See document No. 14.
[3] See document No. 15.

to organize a defense, demand their evacuation at once. If they insist, alleging reasons of defense, and you are persuaded of the absolute necessity of such a measure, permit it, but inform us of the fact. You will warn them, however, that you will be obliged to repulse by force any new infringement on their part. In general every advance of more than 500 meters beyond the frontier must be repulsed by force. The neutral zone will continue to be maintained in this sector owing to our retirement from the frontier line.

(3) What is said in paragraph 2 is also applicable to the sector comprised between Lioumnitsa and Ketchik, excluding the former.

(4) The Greek troops which are located in the sector between Seimen-Kayassi and Lioumnitsa, inclusive, will remain for the present at their posts, unless the opposing troops in their vicinity begin hostilities or advance in large numbers in which case our men must withdraw.

(5) In the sector between Ketchik-Aya and Lake Prespa the neutral zone will be maintained, as ordered. Any infringement in this sector will be repulsed, if necessary, by force, and in those places where the Bulgarians shall, on their side, have violated the neutral zone, our outposts must also advance to reoccupy their posts on the frontier.

(6) In order to avoid needless conflict, in case the Bulgarians or the Germans pass beyond the points indicated above, you will endeavor to communicate with them before taking any action, in order to obtain, in a friendly way, their withdrawal, and the restoration of the *status quo,* until the question shall have been decided by the Governments. In case they threaten to use force, they shall be informed that our troops have likewise been ordered to resort to force. If they undertake to execute their threat, our troops will resist, gun in hand. The forts, with the exception of Dova-Tepe, will also resist all occupation. Whenever the Germans and Bulgarians, withdrawing, reëstablish the neutral zone, our troops will do the same. In your parleys you will always use a friendly tone, striving to avoid all provocation. In case of an engagement between our troops and Bulgarian or German troops the army corps and divisions shall abstain from arrangements of a general nature until they have received orders from us.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 17

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to Brigadier-General Gennadis, Commander of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *Moy 4/17, 1916.*

In reply to the telegram which you have sent me, I inform you that if the Germans or the Bulgarians should occupy, beyond the limits fixed by my order of April 27 of the current year,[1] territories which they might afterwards refuse to evacuate, without in any case using force, we think that it is not to our interest that you should, on your own initiative, give the order to resort to arms, before receiving from us an order to that effect. Consequently, if this eventuality should be realized, you should apply to me and await my instructions, unless it is a matter of an advance of more than 500 meters, in which case the above-mentioned order is clear.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 18

The Commander of Infantry Mavroudis, in command of Fort Roupel, to the Commander of the Fortress of Salonika.

(Telegram)

ROUPEL, *May 13/26, 1916.*

I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that at 9:45 A.M. the appearance of a hostile column was noted, composed of a battalion, a half-squadron of cavalry and of several transport wagons. A Bulgarian officer declared to one of the officers of our covering troops of Eskidje, that at noon a mixed detachment, composed of Germans and Bulgarians, would penetrate into Greek territory preceded by a squadron of German cavalry. This column would have as object the occupation of the most important points in our territory.

MAVROUDIS.

[1] See document No. 16.

No. 19

Brigadier-General Gennadis, Commander of the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens.

(Telegram—Translation)

CAVALLA, *May 13/26, 1916.*

The 6th Division reports that today at 11:15 A.M. the commander of a Bulgarian or Germano-Bulgarian column declared to the Commander of Roupel that it was going to penetrate into our territory. He demanded an answer as to this before midday. A squadron attempted to cross the Bridge of Koula in order thus to enter our territory. The Division (Headquarters) ordered Roupel to offer opposition by force to any advance of more than 500 meters over our frontier, in accordance with your telegraphic orders of April 27 and May 4 of the current year.[1] I approved the order given by the Division and sent word to the Bulgarians that any advance that they might possibly undertake would be opposed by force, without awaiting preliminary authorization by the Greek Ministry of War.

GENNADIS.

No. 20

Brigadier-General Gennadis, Commander of the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens.

(Telegram)

CAVALLA, *May 13/26, 1916.*

The 6th Division announces that two Bulgarian or German regiments have taken up their positions in order of battle opposite Hodjovo (Hodja-Tsiflik); parts of these regiments are advancing towards Hodjovo. I have ordered the Division to conform to the order that I have today transmitted to it by telegraph in regard to Roupel.[2]

[1] See documents Nos. 16 and 17.
[2] See document No. 19.

The Division reports also that German troops have penetrated into our territory, in the Topolnitsa sector, and are advancing in order to occupy the neighboring heights of Vetrina.

GENNADIS.

No. 21

Colonel Messalas of the Engineering Corps, Chief of the Service behind the Lines, to Brigadier-General Dousmanis, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, at Athens.

(Telegram)

SALONIKA, *May 13/26, 1916.*

According to a telegram of the Commander of Fort Roupel, received at 4:00 P.M., the Germano-Bulgarians declared to him, that in consequence of the instructions which they had received from their Governments, they would penetrate into our territory in order to occupy the fort. They at the same time declared that the responsibility for what might follow would fall upon the Commander and the Greek officers of the fort. Thus your order of the 9th of March of the current year [1] is not applicable in the case, since it has in view simply an invasion of our territory, while the Bulgarians demand the occupation of the fort, which is something quite different. Please give me orders.

MESSALAS.

No. 22

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to the Commanders of the 3rd Army Corps at Salonika, of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, of the 6th Division at Serres, and of the Fortress of Salonika.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *May 13/26, 1916.*

In consequence of a report of the 6th Division, according to which the Commander of a Bulgarian or Germano-Bulgarian column has

[1] See document No. 14.

declared to the Commander of Roupel that it was about to penetrate into our territory,[1] we order the application in this circumstance of our order dated March 9 of the current year,[2] which we again put into force in regard to the invaded sector, by canceling, insofar as this sector is concerned, our order of April 27 of the current year.[3]

At the same time make energetic protest to the foreign troops.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 23

Brigadier-General Gennadis, Commander of the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens.

(Telegram—Translation)

CAVALLA, *May 13/26, 1916.*

The 6th Division has just reported to me that the Germano-Bulgarians, having been caught under the fire of Roupel and the covering infantry, made a precipitate retreat as far as beyond Koula. In consequence of this fact, and in accordance with your telegraphic order of today,[4] I have telegraphed to the Division to issue an order prohibiting in future any resistance in such a case, and to postpone the presentation of a protest, until a new advance of the Germano-Bulgarians is reported. A more recent telegram of the Division announces that Germano-Bulgarian detachments crossed our frontier at Koula, marching towards Eskidje, and that in consequence of this new advance, it has proceeded to the presentation of said protest.

GENNADIS.

No. 24

Brigadier-General Bairas, Commanding the 6th Division, to the General Staff of the Army, at Athens.

(Telegram—Translation)

SERRES, *May 14/27, 1916.*

The Commander of Roupel reports that at 10:45 P.M. a Bulgarian officer notified him of an order of the Commander of the troops

[1] See document No. 19.
[2] See document No. 14.
[3] See document No. 16.
[4] See document No. 22.

stationed opposite Roupel, according to which the fort should be evacuated, during the night, or it would be taken by force; if the garrison did not leave the fort during the night, it would be considered cut off from the rest of the army and could no longer communicate with it. The Bulgarian officer added that the material, so far as we could not carry it away, should be delivered to them beyond the Strouma bridge, against a receipt, and on condition of restitution.

In order to avoid the blockading of a whole battalion at Roupel, do you authorize me to give to the garrison the order to leave the fort, except for a company which would remain there, and to take up its position, while awaiting orders, near the main road, at a distance of 2 to 3 kilometers south of the fort? Please give me instructions immediately.

BAIRAS.

No. 25

Protocol of the surrender of Fort Roupel.

(Translation) [1]

FORT ROUPEL, *May 14/27, 1916.*

The Commander of the Fort, John Mavroudis, has surrendered the fort to the German Cavalry (Captain Thiel) with the following material and supplies:

(1) Two guns of 15 cm.
(2) Two guns of 7.5 cm. with 800 shells.
(3) 1,200,000 cartridges.
(4) 6,500 kilos of biscuits.
(5) 350 kilos of sugar.
(6) 150 kilos of butter.

as well as other provisions.

MAVROUDIS,
Commander of Infantry.

THIEL,
Captain of Artillery.

[1] The present protocol was drawn up in German.

No. 26

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to Brigadier-General Bairas, Commander of the 6th Division.

(Telegram—Translation)

ATHENS, *May 15/28, 1916.*

Inform the Bulgarians that according to communications which we have received from the German and Bulgarian Governments, the railroad station at Demir-Hissar is not included in the zone which they claim the right to occupy, and that in consequence of your report it will be made the subject of a new agreement. Their responsibility, therefore, for anything that happens before this agreement is reached will be heavy.

We inform you, however, that the agreement that you requested us to make with Sarrail, as to the use of aeroplanes, is impossible. They insist on the use of aeroplanes. Also an advance of Anglo-French cavalry seems imminent. Under these circumstances leave a small guard-detachment in the railroad station and withdraw in time, if the Anglo-French or Bulgarians advance to occupy it. Make the preceding explanations to your troops in order to maintain their morale. As to the town of Demir-Hissar, keep its garrison always in full force.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 27

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *May 21/June 3, 1916.*

As I have already made known to you, and, at the same time, to the other Royal Legations in the capitals of the Entente, contradicting the information of the "Exchange" Agency,[1] it is entirely false that the occupation of Fort Roupel is due to a preliminary agreement with the Central Powers. The French Government is altogether right in ad-

[1] See White Book 1917, document No. 63.

mitting that this occupation is explained by considerations of defense, but we do not understand how it can for an instant think of reproaching us,—in the presence of this occurrence which the resolution to remain neutral has forced us to tolerate—with having received from the Central Powers the same recognition of territorial integrity and the same assurances for the restitution of the occupied territories as have been furnished us by the Entente Powers. And what we can understand even less is their reproaching us for our passive attitude in the face of the invasion of our territory by the Germano-Bulgarians and their complaining at the so-called abandonment of our policy of benevolent neutrality.

The Powers of the Entente have been from the beginning informed of our intentions, and our policy has been too many times explained to permit of the least doubt existing in their minds. On the 4th of last November we declared to them, through you, "That they ought to understand well that the largest and most sincere benevolence has limits beyond which the maintenance of neutrality becomes impossible, and that the country which is resolved to remain neutral should be careful not to pass these limits."[1] Especially with regard to the entrance into our territory of their enemies, the Entente Powers have been informed by declarations, repeated *ad nauseam*, for the last six months, that we would not oppose it. Mr. Briand should not have forgotten that when, last November, he suggested to us to use strong language[2] to the Bulgarians so as to stop them at our frontier, we hastened to declare to him that "in our condition of neutrality, which we were absolutely resolved to maintain, it was only in case the falling back of the expeditionary force on Salonika bade fair to end in a reëmbarkation that we could use strong language." And when, after the Allies had resolved to remain in Salonika, we had to come to an arrangement with them in regard to questions created by their occupation, it was expressly understood that in case the Allied troops, by reason of their movements, should bring the war into our territory, the Greek armies would withdraw so as to leave the field clear to both parties to settle their conflict.[3] It is therefore absolutely untrue to insinuate that the condition in Macedonia has changed through the fault of Greece, and it is a searching for idle pretexts to claim

[1] See document No. 9.
[2] See document No. 11.
[3] See document No. 12.

a liberty of action in Macedonia, which, in fact, has never been lacking to the Allied armies.

It was in this spirit that I replied, Thursday morning, to Mr. Guillemin, who came to inform me that, in view of the new situation created in Macedonia, General Serrail would probably be obliged to take measures which might appear to him to be necessary for the security of his troops. I requested that a written memorandum of this verbal declaration be left with me. Mr. Guillemin replied that he could not do so without receiving instructions for which he was going to apply, but this did not hinder the "Agence Radio" from publishing next day the purport of his declaration, without my having received the confirmation in writing which I had requested.

Thursday evening Mr. Guillemin came to see me in order to read to me a dispatch in which Mr. Briand instructed him to declare that "if the Bulgarian advance continued in Eastern Macedonia without resistance on the part of the Greek army, most serious consequences for the Greek Government might result therefrom." I represented to him that this injunction to set up a resistance which, in the given case, could only result in our abandoning our neutrality was in flagrant contradiction with the declaration, often repeated and recently published once more, that the Powers have neither the intention nor the desire to make us abandon our neutrality, but Mr. Guillemin was not able to explain to me the significance of this injunction nor the import of the menace of which he spoke.

Things were in this condition when suddenly today, at the hour when the people were preparing to celebrate in Salonika, as in the other cities of the Kingdom, the official Te-Deum in honor of His Majesty the King's fête-day, General Sarrail proclaimed martial law and applying it immediately, rendered the official celebration of the fête impossible. In fact, this morning, French, English and Serbian detachments, equipped with machine guns, occupied various important points in the city and, in succession, the post and telegraph offices, the wireless station, the Government building, the police stations and the State railroad stations. The Chief of the Gendarmery of Macedonia and the Chief of Police were requested to leave Macedonia within twenty-four hours. The Commissaries of Police were begged to stay at their posts until further orders. After taking these measures, General Sarrail contented himself with writing to General

Moschopoulos that "in view of the circumstances, a state of siege is proclaimed in all the zone occupied by the Allied armies."

Please ask to see Mr. Briand without delay in order to make known to him the above-mentioned considerations and facts and to explain to him the great surprise of the Royal Government that such serious measures were adopted without the least previous warning such as we were entitled to expect, if only as a mere matter of courtesy, after the verbal declarations which Mr. Guillemin had been asked to supplement by a written communication. You will please add that the entire nation shares the deep pain of the people of Salonika which was prevented, without any reason, from celebrating the fête of its beloved King, and that the Royal Government, voicing the sentiment of all the Greeks, insists on expressing officially its indignation that a French General, forgetful of the most elementary rules of courtesy and hospitality, in order to inaugurate a régime so manifestly contrary to the respect due to Hellenic sovereignty, should have thought it necessary to choose just the hour when the official ceremony of the fête of His Majesty the King was about to be celebrated. You will, finally, formulate the strongest protests on the part of the Royal Government against the serious assault thus made upon our sovereignty, despite the above-mentioned arrangement of November 27 as to the conditions of the stay of the Allies in Salonika.[1]

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 28

The Commander of Infantry, Mavroudis, to the Commander of the Fortress of Salonika.

(Report—Translation)

DEMIR-HISSAR, *May 29/June 11, 1916.*

I have the honor of bringing to your knowledge that in consequence of an order sent me by the 6th Division, I have turned in the protocol of the surrender of Fort Roupel and the delivery of its material, drawn up and signed by Thiel, Captain of the German Cavalry, and by me, as Commander of the said stronghold.[2]

In regard to the delivery of the material left in the fortress, I have

[1] See White Book 1917, documents Nos. 62 and 63.
[2] See this protocol in No. 25.

the honor to submit to you the three letters, herewith attached, which were addressed to me by Captain Thiel, and I beg you to give me your orders with relation thereto.

You will also find herewith attached the demand for the surrender of the fortress which was addressed to me by this officer.

J. MAVROUDIS.

Annex I

Demand for Surrender addressed by Thiel, Captain of Cavalry, to Mavroudis, Commander of Infantry, in command of Fort Roupel.

(Translation)

May 14/27, 1916.

The German troops have received the order to request the Greek troops to retire before them and to surrender to them the fortifications of Dragotine-Roupel, as well as the positions of Tsinguel-Dag. Furthermore, they cannot allow the presence of Greek troops behind them, nor the occupation in the future, by Greek detachments, of the fortifications of Dragotine and of Roupel.

THIEL.

Annex II

Letter addressed by Thiel, Captain of Cavalry, to Mavroudis, Commander of Infantry.

(Letter—Translation)

May 20/June 2, 1916.

Commandant:

In reply to your kind letter of May 31, 1916 [new style], I have the honor of bringing to your knowledge, by order of my General, that the preparations for the transportation of the guns and the material thereto appertaining, over the Strouma bridge, east of Vetrina, will begin today. The day and hour of the delivery cannot yet be exactly fixed; you will receive another communication about this matter.

I seize this opportunity to assure you of my sentiments of high esteem.

THIEL.

Annex III

Letter addressed by Thiel, Captain of Cavalry, to Mavroudis, Commander of Infantry.

(Letter—Translation)

May 21/June 3, 1916.

Commandant:

By order of my General, I have the honor to inform you that today at 2:30 P.M., the four guns will be ready to be delivered to the Hellenic Government by a German officer, in the main road east of the Vetrina bridge and the Demir-Hissar railway station.

Please accept the assurance of my high esteem.

THIEL.

Annex IV

Letter addressed by Thiel, Captain of Cavalry, to Mavroudis, Commander of Infantry.

(Letter—Translation)

May 25/June 7, 1916.

Commandant:

I have received today your kind letter of June 6 [new style] and I hasten to inform you that the delivery of the guns, which was agreed upon a few days ago, could not, unfortunately, be effected, because at the last moment I received an order from my chief not to deliver them for the present. I regret very much that I was unable to bring this new decision to your knowledge in time, for I only learned this myself at the Bulgarian outposts, when I was awaiting the officer who was designated by you to receive the guns in question.

I have now received the order to inform you that the delivery of the guns can only take place in consequence of an agreement between the Bulgarian and Greek General Staffs.

Please accept the assurance of my high esteem.

THIEL.

No. 29

Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7th Division, and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens.

(Telegram—Translation)

CAVALLA, *August 7/20, 1916.*

I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that, since yesterday, the conduct of the Bulgarians towards our men is entirely hostile. The company of Croussovo, which, not having been willing to submit to the demand to lay down its arms, had resisted the Bulgarians, has probably been annihilated, as is reported by the 6th Division. The regiment of Demir-Hissar is considered by the Bulgarians as prisoner of war, according to the declaration which they have made to the same Division. Our frontier outposts, belonging to the 7th Division, which had been isolated by the advance of the Bulgarians, are still [detained] by them, notwithstanding their promises. The fate of the company of Oxila, of the company of the Idjes fort and of the company at the railway station of Yenikioi is unknown. The companies of Boukia, of the Boukia fort and of Yenikioi have likewise been detained; the Bulgarians, contrary to their promises, do not now permit the sending of a train to Kouslakioi in order to get them. The Bulgarian cavalry, having met on its way a convoy transporting the material of the forts to Drama, has dispersed it and has smashed with pickaxes the wagons and the [caissons] of ammunition.

The Bulgarian columns are followed by plundering comitadjis, who demand from the municipal authorities that they shall deliver to them certain Greeks designated by name, just as was done at Plevna. The panic has spread through the whole region and the inhabitants of the cities of Serres, Drama and Sarissaban, seized with terror, are taking refuge in Cavalla.

In short, the situation is getting worse from moment to moment and the plan of the Bulgarians is clearly seen; it consists in isolating my divisions from each other and in then occupying Eastern Macedonia in its entirety, not excepting even Cavalla; this is what I gather from the repeated declarations of the Bulgarian officers to our own men, according to which statements the Bulgarians would advance in

the direction of [Sarissaban] to meet the Anglo-French troops, when, as a matter of fact, they know perfectly well that there are no Anglo-French troops in this direction. On the other hand, a column coming from Moudjounos is approaching the line of the Cavalla forts. I am making every effort to check it and I have ordered the small forces of the Division left with me to concentrate for the defense of the Cavalla fortresses.

The police of that city and the civil authorities report to me that disorders are threatened. As I have had the opportunity to explain to you, it is impossible to ask and to receive orders in accordance with the exigencies of the circumstances. If then [you wish] that the plans of the Government be executed, you should immediately give me clear and distinct instructions as to the attitude that I ought to take if the Bulgarians should wish to enter Cavalla.

HADJOPOULOS.

No. 30

Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7th Division, and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens.

(Telegram—Translation)

CAVALLA, *August 7/20, 1916.*

The telegraphic and telephonic communications with the 6th Division have been interrupted since 2:00 P.M.; consequently, I do not know what is going on in that sector. The Divisions run the immediate risk of being cut off from each other. A column coming from Moustratli is marching against [illegible words] in order thus to isolate Drama from the south. As I informed you this morning,[1] the conduct of the Bulgarians continues to be hostile. They have only released a small part of the troops captured by them; they have set fire to Fort Idjes, which has been in flames since yesterday. Pillaging and murders have been reported and the Bulgarians have occupied many villages.

In order that I may be able to discuss matters advantageously with the Bulgarians and to obtain an answer from them, I beg you

[1] See document No. 29.

immediately to authorize me to recall to the colors the disbanded reservists, who will readily respond to my appeal. This measure is all the more necessary since there is danger of an uprising of the Mussulman population, to whom, it seems, arms have recently been distributed. Please answer immediately.

I learn from a reliable source that the blockade of Cavalla will be complete in two days.

HADJOPOULOS.

No. 31

Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7th Division, and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps, to the Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) at Athens.

(Telegram—Translation)

CAVALLA, *August 7/20, 1916.*

Please answer immediately my request as to the recall to the colors of the disbanded reservists, because the Bulgarians' intention to occupy Cavalla is more clearly manifested from hour to hour; if such an event happened, the city would be destroyed and the whole Army Corps would be made prisoners by the Bulgarians, whose conduct is treacherous. A delegation of disbanded reservists has declared to me that for their part, they will all, quite voluntarily, hasten to join the colors again.

The immediate dispatch of the fleet is imperative; only its presence can stop the advance of the Bulgarians, support us and tranquillize the population which is in utter confusion.

It is not possible for you at a distance to understand the situation here.

HADJOPOULOS.

No. 32

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7th Division, and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla.

(Telegram—Translation)

ATHENS, *August 8/21, 1916.*

Not wishing to resort to force, we reject your proposition concerning the reservists. Calm the agitated people, and in agreement with the civil authorities endeavor to encourage them. The fleet will not be dispatched. In the course of the day we hope to give you further instructions.

CALLARIS.

No. 33

Brigadier-General Dousmanis, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, to Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7th Division and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps, at Cavalla.

(Telegram—Translation)

ATHENS, *August 8/21, 1916.*

By order of the Government, I herewith transmit to you, for your information, an official communication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in today's papers, and I beg you to bring its contents properly to the knowledge of the [different] sections of the Army Corps which you command:

"On the occasion of the new invasion of the German and Bulgarian troops in Greek territory, the Legations of Germany and Bulgaria at Athens, by order of their Governments, have renewed to the Hellenic Government, in writing, the assurances which were given to it at the time of the first invasion.

"The assurances which were then given and are today renewed are the following: The territorial integrity of the Kingdom and Hellenic sovereignty will be absolutely respected. The German and Bulgarian troops will evacuate Greek territory as soon as the military reasons necessitating this action shall have ceased to exist. The Allies

will respect individual liberty, the rights of ownership and the established religious conditions, and will conduct themselves toward the populations of the country in an absolutely amicable manner. Any damage caused by the German and the Bulgarian troops, during their stay in Greek territory, will be indemnified.

"The Greek Government has given orders to the administrative, judicial, and military authorities of the occupied localities to remain at their posts and to look after the revictualing of the populations."

DOUSMANIS.

No. 34

The Minister of War (General Staff of the Army) to Hadjopoulos, Colonel of Artillery, Commanding the 7th Division, and, temporarily, the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla.

(Telegram—Translation)

ATHENS, *August 17/30, 1916.*

Inform us, after coming to an understanding with the Fortress of Cavalla, where the armament of the batteries of the Fortress is and whether you have entered into negotiations with the Germano-Bulgarian forces for the return of this armament and the transportation of the material into the town.

CALLARIS.

No. 35

Memorandum [addressed] to Mr. N. Politis, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the persecutions against the Greeks in Bulgaria and in the territory occupied temporarily by the Bulgarians.

(According to Official Documents—Translation)

ATHENS, *October 10/23, 1917.*

This summary statement is not intended to prove the systematic persecutions in general, to which the Hellenic element, which has lived in these regions from ancient times, has been subjected since the creation of the Bulgarian Principality; nor is it intended to recall to memory the murders perpetrated in pursuit of a well studied plan from 1906-1908 by the Bulgarian comitadjis, with the consent and

the complicity of the Bulgarian authorities, against the Greek populations of Bourgas, Philippolis, Varna, Stenimachos, etc., the pillage of the Greek churches and schools in these places, which, although built and endowed by Greeks, have nevertheless been seized and given to the Bulgarians, so that at present not a single Greek school or church exists in Bulgaria; nor, lastly, is it intended to recall the emigration *en masse* of the unfortunate Greeks, who, fleeing from Bulgarian persecutions, have had to take refuge in Greece.

The present memorandum is limited to the exposition of the persecutions, the seizures of property and the murders of the Greeks committed by the comitadjis, since the year 1913, with the complicity of the Bulgarian authorities, in order to show once more that, notwithstanding the events which have taken place in the Balkan Peninsula, the promises which have been repeatedly made and the benevolent and paternal attitude of the Hellenic authorities towards the ex-Exarchists who live in the new Hellenic territories, the hatred of everything Greek, the spoliation of the private properties of Greeks, born and established in Bulgaria, the expulsion of the latter from the country of their birth, constitute, as in the past, the fundamental basis of the Bulgarian policy and administration.

Hardly had the Bulgarians, in 1913, annexed the part of Thrace which fell to them in consequence of the war against Turkey, than they immediately put into operation all sorts of means of violence, such as mal-treatment, imprisonment, beating, etc., in order brutally to expel from their native country all the Greeks of Thrace (who were thus obliged to take refuge in Hellenic territory), and subsequently to seize arbitrarily their properties, in order to give them over principally to adherents who, choosing Bulgarian nationality, were leaving Greek territory in order to settle in Bulgaria, not without having previously made sure of the free disposition of their immovable property in Greece by means of leases or sales drawn up in due form before the proper Hellenic authorities.

The immovable properties of the Greeks thus expelled have been declared by the Bulgarian Government properties without owners, and subsequently confiscated, a very short time, as a matter of form, having been granted to the interested parties to present the title-deeds of their properties; of course, secret orders, given to the authorities, forbade the expelled Greeks to cross the frontier; the few Greeks, such as Telonidis, Matsopoulos, Fimerellis, etc., who, thanks to diplomatic

steps, succeeded in reaching their homes, were immediately imprisoned. The archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs contain a large number of reports and complaints setting forth the lamentable situation of the Greeks thus despoiled.

To the representations made by the Hellenic Government to the Minister of Bulgaria in Greece, and by the Minister of Greece in Bulgaria to the Bulgarian Government, the latter, following its usual tactics, has constantly limited itself to giving vague promises and to publishing the circular of June 17, 1915, No. 139, which interprets the Royal Decree of 1915, No. 49, by which it fixed a ridiculously short delay of five days, during which the owners of immovable properties, even those residing abroad, were obliged to present the title-deeds of their properties for so-called "verification," in default of which the immovable properties would be confiscated and declared state property.

It should be noted that the measures in question were executed in Bulgaria not by way of reprisals,—since the Hellenic Government has never resorted to such spoliations,—but simply in order to Bulgarize by force the country, which is essentially Greek, and to enrich the Bulgarians at the expense of the Greeks, for as is shown by the statistical table hereto annexed, the value of the movable and immovable property of the Greeks who were obliged to leave the Bulgarian districts of Gumuldjina, Xanthi, Agathupolis, Dedeagatch, Sufli, Ortakioi, Adrianople, Sozopolis, Vasiliko, Lagos, Mustapha-Pasha in Thrace, and of Melnik, Petritsi, Nevrokop, Strumnitsa, Kizilagatch, in Bulgarian Macedonia, in order to take refuge in the newly acquired Greek territory, leaving out of the account those that went to Old Greece and the Islands of the Ægean Sea, about whom the necessary data has not yet been definitely obtained, amounts to 167 million francs.

In regard to Thrace, it may be pertinent to mention that even the Greek cemetery of Xanthi has not escaped Bulgarian vandalism; in order to efface every trace which might recall the existence of the Greek element, the Bulgarian authorities did not hesitate to open the tombs, to exhume and throw the bones into the privies, to break the grave stones which bore Greek inscriptions, and finally to transform the church of the cemetery into a stable; such was the fate of the tombs of the Greek families Ladas, Maletsidis, Couyoumdjoglou, Stalios, etc.

How can one characterize, too, the conduct of the Bulgarians since they have occupied Eastern Greek Macedonia?

The documents recently published in the Greek White Book (1917) from Nos. 70 to 77 show in a sufficiently startling manner the really desperate condition of the Greeks,—the victims of insufferable Bulgarian outrages; imprisonments, expulsions, murders, hangings and raping are the order of the day; these crimes are committed sometimes by the Bulgarians, sometimes by their faithful allies, the Turks; the plundering of the properties of the Greek population there has been systematically organized; all means have been used; requisitions of goods without payment or promise of payment, extortion of money, arbitrary confiscation of furniture and other things for transportation to the houses of Bulgarian officers in Sofia; on account of want of provisions and principally of bread, thousands of persons have died of starvation at Drama, Serres and Cavalla; under the pretext of want of provisions, but in fact in order to exterminate methodically the Greek element of Eastern Macedonia and in the hope of modifying its national character, a large part of the Greek population has been transported to the interior of Bulgaria.

The same things have happened in the district of Monastir which is occupied by the Bulgarian troops; there exist in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece numerous lists of priests, women, private citizens, all being peaceful and inoffensive people, who have been expelled, imprisoned and massacred, and whose movable and immovable properties have been taken away from them; such is the case of Peter Nambis, Michael Anastasiou, killed at Croussovo on December 10, 1915, by Bulgarian comitadjis; of Vanghelis, killed in the Bulgarian quarter of Monastir, December 13, 1915; of Zissis Pharmakis killed on December 31, 1915, near Resna, by Bulgarian soldiers; of Marcos Karayas, imprisoned since the 19th of December, 1915; of Michael Tegos and of Kalessis, Mayor of Yangovetsi, whose fate is unknown, etc. The same condition exists in the part of the Vilayet of Adrianople ceded to Bulgaria by Turkey in 1915, when the question of the former's alliance with the Central Powers was being discussed.

Besides, all the Greek subjects residing either in Bulgaria, or in the countries occupied by her, were drafted by force into the Bulgarian army, notwithstanding all the representations and protests of the Hellenic Legation.

Unfortunately, even in Bulgaria proper, the condition of the

Greeks is no better; if they are not exactly subjected to the same annoyances as their compatriots of the new provinces which have been annexed or temporarily occupied by the Bulgarians, they suffer just as much from the arbitrary actions of the authorities, solely on account of their being Greeks; their situation is always precarious and on the least suspicion, or on the first accusation, they run the risk of being imprisoned and forced to leave the country. This forms a brief and incomplete résumé of the situation of the Greeks since 1913.

We have no precise information concerning the situation of the Greeks since the recent rupture of the relations between Greece and Bulgaria, but from certain information which we have received indirectly we learn that this situation, already extremely distressing in the past, has become considerably worse.

Appendix

Statistical Table, first, of the Greeks who were obliged to leave the Bulgarian districts of Thrace and Macedonia to take refuge in Hellenic Macedonia and, second, of the property abandoned by them.[1]

I. Greeks Driven Out from the Districts of Thrace

No.	District	City or Village	Number of families	Number of individuals	Sum total in drachmas of the fortunes given up
1	Ghioumouldgina	Ghioumouldgina	494	1,914	14,058,437
2	"	Chirkas	164	625	1,907,187
3	"	Kioutchoukkioi	159	660	1,440,432
4	"	Sali	69	295	580,490
5	"	Bouladkioi	35	152	375,318
6	"	Gritzan-Assar	121	448	870,600
7	"	Yassikioi	109	454	2,622,376
8	"	Lefedgiler	1	5	3,700
9	"	Misselimkioi	2	6	7,305
10	"	Kirtchiflik	1	5	299,200
11	"	Soussourkioi	4	8	53,520
12	"	Imaret	1	6	8,040

[1] This statistical table, which has been prepared from the detailed statistics of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, does not contain the number, nor the value of the movable and immovable properties of those of the refugees who went to Old Greece and the Islands of the Ægean Sea, as regards whom the necessary data have not yet been definitely gathered.

I. Greeks Driven Out from the Districts of Thrace (*Cont.*)

No.	District	City or Village	Number of families	Number of individuals	Sum total in drachmas of the fortunes given up
13	Ghioumouldgina	Ketchikioi	1	6	8,610
14	"	Sirikli	1	1	8,610
15	"	Kikitchi	1	2	8,300
16	"	Kirtzali	2	12	38,910
17	"	Karatzolkioi	1	1	8,600
18	Xanthi	Xanthi	1,062	4,344	27,797,350
19	"	Kouyounkioi	158	743	1,957,284
20	"	Yenidje	23	91	235,400
21	"	Bouloustra	170	827	2,272,753
22	"	Porto-Lago	13	44	223,360
23	"	Kedikler	1	1	4.040
24	"	Yenti-Pire	1	2	7,640
25	"	Inanli	1	1	10,400
26	"	Demir-Beili	1	4	700
27	"	Kotsombas	1	1	3,070
28	Agathoupolis	Brodivo	164	557	2,065,729
29	"	Galatzi	28	93	229,072
30	"	Kosti	181	665	2,871,485
31	"	Kalatzaik	1	1	1,000
32	Dedeagatch	Dedeagatch	458	1,949	13,736,443
33	"	Soufli	942	4,198	19,339,591
34	"	Makri	135	533	2,829,520
35	"	Maronia	270	1,207	7,438,557
36	"	Roumtziki	133	473	1,874,193
37	"	Ferrai	77	326	2,283,318
38	"	Chantzia	1	5	29,010
39	"	Tchobankioi	1	1	2,300
40	Soufli	Karabounar	14	49	576,895
41	"	Kavadjikioi	314	1,232	1,763,114
42	"	Kornopholea	304	1,214	4,122,720
43	"	Pasmaktchi	96	342	1,004,580
44	"	Dadia	158	612	1,256,284
45	"	Kozgori	3	14	46,085
46	Ortakioi	Tchekerdekli	187	769	1,647,000
47	"	Lititsa	184	754	4,823,225
48	"	Palikrava	76	278	866,039
49	"	Mandritsa	99	382	3,337,011
50	"	Akalan	66	288	761,197
51	"	Ketenli	1	6	17,800
52	"	Limbavou	2	11	24,670
53	Adrianople	Moustapha-Pacha	17	71	402,404
54	"	Ortakioi	524	2,127	13,256,336
55	Sozopolis	Vassiliko	236	830	3,006,765
56	Vassiliko	Agathoupolis	321	1,129	4,704,025
57	Lagos	Karagatch	1	5	650
58	Moustapha-Pacha	Koumarli	1	7	19,100
59	"	Belova	3	18	9,620
		Total	7,595	30,804	149,157,370

II. Greeks Driven Out from the Districts of Macedonia

No.	District	City or Village	Number of families	Number of individuals	Sum total in drachmas of the fortunes given up
60	Melnik	Melnik	470	1,861	7,258,156
61	"	Petrovo	10	49	146,185
62	"	Ano-Djoumaya	32	126	968,480
63	"	Sfetivrats	4	19	90,600
64	"	Tchiflikia	1	1	2,800
65	"	Prepetsina	1	4	12,430
66	"	Dere-Mousli	1	1	3,008
67	"	Piperitza-Tchiflik	1	1	55,875
68	Petritsi	Petritsi	13	65	193,240
69	"	Bogoroditsa	19	81	189,000
70	"	Sirvan	10	39	66,753
71	"	Startchovo	109	455	1,481,198
72	Nevrokop	Nevrokop	72	279	1,928,132
73	"	Papatchair	78	400	498,422
74	"	Dovliani	2	3	9,400
75	Stroumnitsa	Stroumnitsa	143	624	3,741,148
76	"	Mokrenon	95	440	1,123,630
77	"	Zibovo	70	308	586,705
78	"	Gavrovo	2	4	38,770
79	"	Kolessi	2	7	39,510
80	Kizilagatch	Kioutchouk-Boyalik	24	95	94,100
		Total	1,159	4,862	18,527,542
		Grand total	8,754	35,666	167,684,912

PART II

ATHENS, *October 16/29, 1917.*

Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the President of the Chamber of Deputies.

City
(Translation)

Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit to you the translations of a number of dispatches in cipher, exchanged between the former King and Queen and Berlin, and I beg you to be good enough to transmit them to the Parliamentary Commission acting as Public Prosecutor before the High Court, which has been constituted to try the members of the Skouloudis and Lambros Cabinets.

With a view to enlightening the said Commission as to the means employed for the exchange of this telegraphic correspondence and as to the process followed in order to discover the key to the Palace cipher, I think it proper to give you the following information:

At the request of the Palace, this Ministry transmitted nearly two years ago to the then King, a small French ciphered dictionary, dated 1884, of which our department was no longer making use.

This dictionary was utilized by the Palace as the basis of a cryptographic system, entirely new and decidedly complicated, the explanation of which can be given by the proper officials of this Ministry to the above-said Commission, if the latter thinks it useful.

A second copy of this dictionary was in the possession of Mr. N. Theotoky, then Minister of Greece at Berlin, who, by order of the King, and without the knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has applied there, also, the same cryptographic system.

This telegraphic correspondence was carried on by three means: by the wireless telegraph, by cable and by a telegraphic land wire which worked for some time by way of Monastir.

When the wireless was used, the telegrams were sent through our station at Athens to the station at Sofia which transmitted them to Berlin and vice-versa.

The transmission by cable was made in the following manner:

On a printed paper of the ciphering bureau of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, the address of the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne was written with the phrase: "Please transmit the following telegram under No. ... to our Minister at Berlin, informing us of receipt of same."[1] The text of the telegram to be sent followed, turned into cipher with the aid of the Palace dictionary, and having the name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs affixed (whether with or without the knowledge of the latter, I am unable to state), and the dispatch was subsequently given to the telegraph office.

According to my information this work was entrusted to Mr. Rhoidis, the Secretary of the King, who was in the habit of going for this purpose to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is, at any rate, clear from the text of the telegrams sent that these were put into cipher by Mr. J. Theotoky, the Master of Ceremonies at the Court of the ex-Queen.

Unfortunately, we have in our possession only a part of the telegrams exchanged, that is to say, the originals of some telegrams found in the files of the Office of Control of the Posts and Telegraphs, and the telegrams which were transmitted, particularly from Berlin, by wireless, the combinations of which were copied down in the Registry Book of our station at Athens.

As for the telegrams which were sent or received by the land wire through Monastir, these are totally lacking.

The fact that a large part of this correspondence is missing is evidenced also by the special serial number of the telegrams of the Palace, which at the end of 1916, had reached a number higher than three hundred.

Please accept, etc. N. POLITIS.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO THE ABOVE LETTER

The translation of the dispatches in cipher, exchanged between the Royal Court of Athens and Berlin, has become possible through the discovery of the conventional paging and the double ciphering of the groups corresponding to words, applied to the French Code Dictionary of 1884 (composed by Mr. G. A. Argyropoulos). The wireless message sent by Mr. N. Theotoky to King Constantine and inserted in this book under No. 42, in which the text of a letter of the

[1] Some of these telegrams were sent to the Royal Legation at Rome with instructions to have them sent by mail to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne, who was charged with their transmission by telegraph to Berlin.

S. Bleichroeder Bank of Berlin was transmitted to the National Bank of Greece, served as a basis for the discovery of the said cryptographic system. In fact, the translation of this wireless message, which was found in the files of the National Bank of Greece, and the text in cipher of this same wireless message, inserted in the Registry Book of the wireless station at Athens, made it possible, by the juxtaposition of the words with the corresponding ciphers (see below) to discover the meaning of a certain number of ciphers and little by little to obtain the ciphers of all the words in the dictionary.

(Radiotelegram)

(Station XM to Station ATA)

Very urgent.

His Majesty the King. ATHENS.

(Received December 23, 1915/January 5, 1916.)

J'ai 750	l' 6277	honneur 1112	de 0990	communiquer 6829	à 2123	Votre 8159	Majesté 7786	texte 5035

lettre 7434	adressée 43078	par 9031	Bl 192	ei 252	ch 184	ro 596	ed 283	er 201	à la 6225

Banque Nationale de Grèce 3220	et 9745	je 3417	[?]	Votre 8159	Majesté 7786	daigner 0980

communiquer 6829	cette 6598	lettre 7434	à la 6225	Banque Nationale de Grèce 3220	et 9745

me 2500	transmettre 1860	télégraphiquement 3642	confirmation 3348	stop	" 31	Berlin 3261

le 6202	cinq 0671	janvier 3435	1916	stop	A la	Banque Nationale de Grèce 3220

Athènes 2279	stop	Je 3417	confirme 33480	par la 6256	présente 2917	que 3509	je 3417	vous 0884

ouvre 26490	un 4097	crédit 8727	de 0990	quarante 3562	millions 48262	marks 25482	sous 9533	les 7497

conditions 99872	suivantes 70025	: 87	Vous êtes 874	autorisés 94008	soit 931	de 0990	disposer 8981

sur ma 1311	caisse 2420	soit 931	de 0990	tirer 5031	sur 7094	moi 1460	par 9031	traites 80692	trimestrielles 18605

, 68	au total 8094	jusqu'à 0395	concurrence 9950	de la 6214	somme 4186	susdite 7046	stop

Pour les 7574	dispositions 89092	vous me 0893	bonifierez 44886	six 4144	pour 8551	cent 4592	de 0990

intérêt 1200	par 9031	an 5371	net 3930	, 68	pour les 7574	traites 80692	cinq 0671	huitièmes 11242

pour 8551	cent 4592	de 0990	commission 6897	par 9031	trimestre 1840	stop	Je m' 0300	engage 98800

à 2123	renouveler 4725	les 7497	traites 80692	de 0990	trois 1846	en 9814	trois 1846	mois 1407	, 68

le 6202	remboursement	ayant 890	lieu 7488	trois 1846	mois 1407	après 8280	conclusion 9966

de la 6214	palx 9079	stop	Vous 0884	garderez 10576	en 9814	portefeuille 4966	le	papier 9087

émis 15668	sur 7094	moi 1460	stop	Veuillez 0874	confirmer 3348	ce qui 6596	précède 29250	stop

Croyez 0930 735	Messieurs 56212	à mes 4874	sentiments 27232	bien 4423	distingués 01628	Signé 27588

S 5764	stop	BI 192	el 252	ch 184	ro 596	ed 283	er 201	" 75	THEOTOKY

The wireless stations of Athens and Sofia which were utilized for the transmission of the radiotelegrams exchanged between the Royal Court of Athens and Berlin, are indicated by the respective call numbers, that is ATA for the Athens station and XM for that of Sofia. Some of these radiotelegrams were transmitted by the wireless station of Constantinople, the call name of which is OSM.[1]

[1] See also radiotelegram No. 78.

No. 36

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the King, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 1/14, 1915.*

The dispatch of Your Majesty in regard to the advance of forty millions was received yesterday evening.[1] I immediately proceeded to take the necessary steps and I hope soon to be able to communicate to Your Majesty their result.

THEOTOKY.

No. 37

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 2/15, 1915.*

The Minister of Finance has authorized me to telegraph to Your Majesty that the German Government is in principle ready to advance to us the forty million francs [illegible words]. The Minister begs Your Majesty to telegraph to me, whether it suits you that the Imperial Government should open [a credit] for the above-mentioned amount with the Banks of Berlin, upon which credit the National Bank of Greece may draw by check on Berlin. The interest will be 6 per cent. and the advance will be reimbursed by the loan which is under negotiation.

THEOTOKY.

[1] This dispatch is missing.

No. 38

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 8/21, 1915.*

I have the honor to inform Your Majesty in reply to Your telegram dated the 4th[1] that the Minister of Finance informs me that the opening of the credit in Swiss banks is technically impossible because the German Government has no deposits in Switzerland and that it is impossible to send You forty millions in gold. Besides, this transmission could not remain secret, and this would compromise both Switzerland and Greece. If it is necessary to negotiate with Switzerland, this will require as much time as the negotiations for the loan.

THEOTOKY.

No. 39

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 16/29, 1915.*

I have the honor to inform You, in reply to Your dispatch of the 11th,[2] that in order to insure more discretion in the matter, the credit will be opened entirely with S. Bleichrœder upon whom the National Bank will be able to draw. Bleichrœder would charge for the acceptance [of the drafts] five-eighths per cent. quarterly. For the advance in cash six per cent. annually net. I beg You to explain to me what Your Majesty understands by "franc." Does it mean Greek francs? Furthermore, please make a proposition on the relation between francs and marks. For my guidance please telegraph

[1] This telegram is missing.
[2] This telegram is missing.

immediately in what manner the National Bank of Greece intends to transform the Berlin credit into means of payment.

THEOTOKY.

No. 40

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 16/29, 1915.*

The dispatches of Your Majesty of the 10th and 13th instant have been received.[1] On Thursday evening I took with von Jagow the steps prescribed in the first dispatch, dated the 10th, and yesterday I renewed my representations in order to make the declaration concerning the King of Bulgaria. I have seen von Jagow again this evening. In the course of my two previous interviews, von Jagow simply took cognizance of the declarations that I made to him, reserving to himself the right to study them; after an understanding with the Chief of the General Staff he will give the reply of the Imperial Government. In the course of the interview of this evening the Minister, although declaring that he was not yet in a position to discuss properly the propositions formulated by Your Majesty, did not hide from me that after a careful study of the propositions in question, he was rather disconcerted by their importance and extent.

Von Jagow made known to me that the exchange of views between the Imperial Government and the General Staff continues and that, in all probability, General Falkenhayn will arrive tomorrow in Berlin, which will permit von Jagow to continue with him the study of my demands.

From the interviews which I have had with von Jagow and R (?) I have gathered the following impressions: Our demands have been, so to speak, divided into three groups: The first contains those that can be accepted easily; the second those which may become the object of discussion and which present a chance of coming to an understanding with us; and lastly, the third, which contains those which are almost certainly incapable of realization. I have every reason to

[1] These telegrams are missing.

believe that in the last [is included our] proposition concerning Monastir, as it first appeared, as well as in its revised form.

What precedes constitutes, I repeat, my first impressions which are not based on express declarations, inasmuch as the persons with whom I conversed have up to now avoided every detailed discussion on each of the points dealt with in the dispatch of Your Majesty, and have done this on the ground of the necessity of first coming to an understanding with the Chief of the General Staff.

Apart from these impressions, I have had the feeling that they have not yet decided in an absolutely certain manner whether they would undertake, under these conditions, an offensive action against the Anglo-French. It seems that for some days the doubt has arisen whether it may not be better to renounce for the present any action against the troops of the Entente in Salonika and to limit themselves to a defensive action which might be made with relatively few troops and with insignificant sacrifices. I cannot tell whether General Falkenhayn, too, has felt the influence of this tendency, inasmuch as the data which I possess do not permit me to decide. The last time I saw the General, he seemed to be convinced, on the contrary, that German interests imposed upon him the duty of undertaking this action.

THEOTOKY.

No. 41

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 19/January 1, 1916.*

I have had the honor of receiving Your dispatch dated the day before yesterday.[1] I saw [Mr. Zimmermann] immediately afterwards and Mr. Schwabach. Both assured me that they agree that the advance of the forty millions should be made in marks. [Mr. Zimmermann] undertook to speak about it to the Minister of Finance. Mr. Schwabach has promised to send me on Monday a letter about this matter for the National Bank of Greece.

THEOTOKY.

[1] This dispatch is missing.

No. 42

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 23, 1915/January 5, 1916.*

I have the honor to communicate to Your Majesty the text of a letter addressed by Mr. Bleichrœder to the National Bank of Greece and I [beg] Your Majesty to transmit this letter to the National Bank of Greece and to advise me by telegraph of its confirmation.

THEOTOKY.

TEXT OF THE LETTER OF THE S. BLEICHRŒDER BANK.

BERLIN, *January 5, 1916.*

[To the] National Bank of Greece.

Athens.

I confirm by the present that I am opening for you a credit of forty millions of marks under the following conditions:

You are authorized either to have a credit in my bank at your disposal or to draw on me by quarterly drafts, up to the full total of the above amount.

For the credit at your disposal you will allow me a net six per cent. interest, annually; for the drafts five-eighths per cent. commission quarterly.

I bind myself to renew the drafts every three months, the [payment] to be made three months after the conclusion of peace.

You will keep .....

Please confirm the above.

Believe me, Gentlemen,

Yours most sincerely,

S. BLEICHRŒDER.

No. 43

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 30, 1915/January 12, 1916.*

Von Jagow has asked me to telegraph to Your Majesty in order respectfully to beg You to communicate to me Your reply to the dispatch of December 24/January 6[1] because the question is most urgent.

THEOTOKY.

No. 44

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *January 8/21, 1916.*

In reply to the telegram of Your Majesty of the 17th,[2] I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that S. Bleichrœder has just sent me a second letter, also dated January 5th, containing the phrase of adhesion (?) as well as an additional [clause] in regard to the stamp.

THEOTOKY.

No. 45

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *January 8/21, 1916.*

Supplementing my telegram of January 4/17,[3] I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of Your Majesty that General Falkenhayn

[1] This dispatch is missing.
[2] This dispatch is missing.
[3] This dispatch is missing.

informs me that the action against the troops of the Entente may be taken on the following conditions: (1) Our troops guarding the frontiers shall retire on the whole frontier from Lake Prespa to a place where the boundary touches the Mesta, northeast of Cavalla. (2) Our 5th Army Corps shall assemble at and around Cavalla, so that it shall nowhere be further than twenty kilometers from that city. (3) All our other troops shall retire beyond the line of Ekaterini, as far as to the southern shore of Lake Prespa. (4) Greece shall bind herself not to admit or tolerate debarkations of the Entente either in the Gulf of Cavalla or in the Bay of Ekaterini and, if necessary, to prevent them by force. (5) His Majesty, the King of the Hellenes, shall take the engagement toward His Majesty, the Emperor of Germany, that no public officer, soldier or inhabitant will be employed on the part of the Royal Government in hostile acts against the German troops and their allies. (6) Greece shall consent to the use of the [Xanthi], Drama, Serres and [Doiran] railway by Germany and her allies.

The Chief of Staff begs Your Majesty to answer immediately.

THEOTOKY.

No. 46

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *January 17/30, 1916.*

I have the honor to inform you that I have communicated to Bleichrœder the confirmation of the National Bank of Greece.

THEOTOKY.

No. 47

His Majesty King Constantine to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ATA to Station XM)

ATHENS, *March 10/23, 1916.*

General Falkenhayn has made known to us the intention of the allied troops to occupy the Demir-Hissar pass, between Mounts Beles and Tsinguel, as a defensive measure in consequence of the action of the Anglo-French, and has asked us to evacuate this sector. We have replied that we were waiting for the Imperial German Government to give us in advance, through its Minister here, the declaration which [illegible words] [already] indicated. If he [illegible words] that the measure which they intend to take is defensive and they simultaneously give us the assurance that the text of the above-mentioned declaration has been accepted, in order that it may be communicated to us in its entirety as soon as the advance on Salonika is decided upon, we should be disposed to accept, although we would not yet say so in the hope of succeeding in obtaining immediately the above-mentioned condition, in lack of which we shall insist on having a short declaration concerning the future of the sector which shall be occupied, and, generally, the integrity and independence of the Kingdom.

I bring the above to your knowledge in order that you may be informed as to the disposition of the Royal Government in case they should take the initiative in Berlin of [illegible words] enterprise.[1]

KING CONSTANTINE.

[1] There follows a phrase of a private nature by Mr. N. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie.

No. 48

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *March 12/25, 1916.*

For Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Up to the present, no reference has been made as to the request of the Chief of Staff, as communicated by the dispatch of Your Excellency. They have [illegible words] to me semi-officially [illegible words] in a private character, that there is [illegible word] text of the declaration to Falkenhausen, sent from Athens, but they avoid expressing an opinion as to this text.

THEOTOKY.

For Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

The last letter received was dated January 29. I immediately answered, entrusting my letter to the Vice-Consul of Germany at Athens, who is still at [illegible words] not being able [illegible words] Athens. The present situation with the telegraphic and postal difficulties of communication is intolerable. Write from time to time. I embrace you.

THEOTOKY.

No. 49

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *May 5/18, 1916.*

For Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs:

In reference to my telegram of the 1/14 instant,[1] I have the honor

[1] This telegram is missing.

to inform you that the Chief of the General Staff, after the receipt of the telegram of the Department of Foreign Affairs, transmitting my last communication, advised this Department today that he had telegraphed to Field Marshal Mackensen to examine the situation anew in the most minute manner, and particularly to scrutinize closely the information concerning the movements of the troops of the Entente, upon which the demand for the occupation of the passes in question is based.

THEOTOKY.

No. 50

His Majesty King Constantine to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ATA to Station XM)

ATHENS, *May 13/26, 1916.*
(Transmitted May 14/27, 1916.)

Dispatch of Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs:

I have received your dispatch dated yesterday.[1] Count von Mirbach, in the name of Germany and her allies, has handed to me a letter containing very nearly the assurances which were demanded. I replied that I had taken note of these and begged the Minister kindly to thank the Imperial Government in my name. A little later the Minister of Bulgaria, in the name of his Government, handed me an identical letter of which I also took note. I am awaiting the return of His Majesty, the King, from Thessaly in order to bring the matter to his knowledge.

SKOULOUDIS.

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

His Majesty the King has returned from his trip which was a real apotheosis. He begs you to find out what has become of the repro-

[1] This telegram is missing.

ductions of his picture of Lasloo.[1] Pantazopoulos arrived today. Many thanks. Psychas will be replaced by [Rangabe]. Theotoky.

KING CONSTANTINE.

No. 51

Her Majesty Queen Sophie to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ATA to Station XM)

ATHENS, *June 12/25, 1916.*

Please send the following telegrams, first translating them into German:

To His Majesty the Emperor:

I am in despair. I hope that your advice may still help to ameliorate the situation. I embrace you affectionately.

SOPHIE.

To Her Royal Highness Princess M (?):

I am very much upset. We hope for an amelioration of the situation. Terribly hot. Am feeling pretty well.

SOPHIE.

No. 52

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *June 13/26, 1916.*

The recent events in our country have made a deep impression here. The prevailing opinion is that we could not have done otherwise than give way, although people here seem to think that [illegible words] we could perhaps have given way conditionally; that is, that this situation ought not to have been brought about until after the evacuation of our territory by the troops of the Entente, in view of

[1] There follows a remark of a private nature.

the fact that as things are now the Parliamentary elections will take place under the pressure and the influence of the Anglo-French bayonets. The above are only academic considerations, granted that one has a complete understanding of the position of Your Majesty and does not, in any way, wish to render it more difficult, either by advice or by any pretentions whatsoever. There is reason to think that people here will accommodate themselves to the new condition of things, although there are serious fears that the pressure of the Entente will not stop and that it will continue to be exercised upon us with the connivance of Mr. Venizelos so as to arrive, by resorting, if necessary, to extreme internal upheavals, at the well-known objects. What preoccupies them seriously is the idea that Mr. Venizelos, supported by the Entente, may come out victorious at the elections, and this might lead to very painful consequences both from the internal and external points of view. They regret very much the departure of Mr. Skouloudis, who had won their confidence and esteem.

THEOTOKY.

For Mr. Skouloudis:

I beg Your Excellency to permit me to present to you my sentiments of profound gratitude for the kindness which you manifested to me during your Ministry and to accept, with my sincere regret for your retirement, my very best wishes. All here regret the fact.

THEOTOKY.

For Mr. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

In regard to Corfu, I think that the best thing is to let them do as they please. I am very pessimistic for the future, and I fear that they have it as their ultimate aim to compel the King and the dynasty to withdraw. God help us! I embrace you.

THEOTOKY.

No. 53

Mr. Th. Ypsilanti, 1st Equerry of the King, to Mr. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ATA to Station XM)

ATHENS, *June 16/29, 1916.*

Please telegraph to Emmanuel Ypsilanti, at Rapoltenkirchen, Pressbaum, Lower Austria, asking him whether he intends to be a candidate at Jannina and when he will arrive at Athens. Explain to him that it is absolutely necessary that he should become a candidate. Please answer by return. Best [greetings].

YPSILANTI.[1]

No. 54

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *July 6/19, 1916.*

The Chancellor of the Empire begged me to go and see him. He asked me to express to Your Majesty how deeply concerned he was to learn of the fire at Tatoi and also his joy that Your Majesties and the Royal Family are safe and sound.

Your Majesty will see in my telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs No. 1989,[2] the exact text of the official part of this interview. I will therefore limit myself in the present dispatch to developing the confidential part of our conversation.

The Chancellor having spoken to me of the trip of Prince Nicholas to Russia, I thought it proper to define the significance of this mission. I [illegible words] him that the journeys of Prince Nicholas and Prince Andrew to Petrograd and London had not a political but only

[1] A postscript by Mr. J. Theotoky follows treating of some matters of a private nature.

[2] This telegram never reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

a dynastic character. The Princes were to explain to the Sovereigns of Russia and England the policy of Your Majesty and make them understand that the policy followed by their Governments in Greece only undermined the throne, without [having] any practical utility. I insisted that the mission of their Royal Highnesses was exactly prescribed and did not in any way concern the political orientation that Your Majesty has followed and that it had particularly in view the strengthening of the bonds existing between Your Royal House and the Courts of Petrograd and London, bonds which had recently become much relaxed. I concluded by expressing the hope that His Majesty the Emperor and the Imperial Government would understand the necessity of these steps and that the declarations which I had just made to His Excellency would be received in the same spirit of frankness and loyalty which had prompted them.

To my great satisfaction von Bethmann-Hollweg replied to me that he perfectly understood the necessities which dictated these steps and expressed the hope that they would be crowned with success. At the same time he thanked me for the frank and loyal declarations which I had made to him.

The Chancellor begged me to call upon von Jagow, who leaves today for General Headquarters, and to repeat what I had just told him, in order that the Minister might communicate these declarations to His Majesty the Emperor. Von Jagow received my declarations in the same way, promising me that he would faithfully transmit them to His Majesty the Emperor.

From the numerous questions which were put to me by the Chancellor about the arrangements for the trip of Prince Nicholas and the possibility of His Royal Highness's stopping at Berlin on his return from Petrograd, I have derived the impression that the Chancellor would like to see His Highness during his passage through Berlin. If Your Majesty thinks that there will not be anything out of the way in this I beg You to be so good as to give me Your orders which I will communicate to the Prince on his arrival here. I may add that, in case of necessity, all necessary measures can be taken so that the interview may remain secret.

THEOTOKY.

No. 55

His Majesty King Constantine to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ATA to Station XM)

ATHENS, *August 2/15, 1916.*

I have been informed by the German military attaché very confidentially and without further details that the Germans are getting together two armies against Rumania under the command of Mackensen. Can you learn the reason? Is it a sign that they have decided to act against Rumania in order to prevent a possible attack if she does not disarm?

KING CONSTANTINE.

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

Do not send dispatches in the name of His Majesty the King but put as address only two W's. Affectionately.

THEOTOKY.

No. 56

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to [His Majesty King Constantine], at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *August 3/16, 1916.*

I have the honor to inform you, in reply to your telegram dated yesterday,[1] that according to positive information there is no intention, for the present, of taking the initiative in attacking Rumania: the concentration of troops opposite Rumania is made for the purpose of intimidating her. It has, however, been decided to attack her if she takes any aggressive measures against Austria, but there is no reason to believe that she will do so.

[1] See document No. 55.

On the contrary, the army under Mackensen will at once undertake an offensive against the army of the Entente in Macedonia as a reprisal to the action of that army against the Bulgarian front. I do not know whether this action will be definite and rapid. I suppose that it will rather be only partial. Von Bethmann Hollweg has today telegraphed to Count von Mirbach to communicate to [illegible words] this intention of the German Supreme Command, repeating to him the assurance that the guarantees and assurances given [illegible words] are maintained in their integrity.[1]

No. 57

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *August 5/18, 1916.*

Von Jagow has informed me confidentially and for the personal information of Your Majesty that the concentration of troops against Rumania is intended chiefly to intimidate her. Germany and her allies have decided not to take the initiative in attacking her. If Rumania permits the passage of Russian troops through her territory, or if she makes the slightest gesture against Austria or Bulgaria, then they will attack her immediately. Von Jagow continues to believe that Rumania has been joking and that she will not do .....[2]

THEOTOKY.

No. 58

Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ATA to Station XM)

ATHENS, *August 9/22, 1916.*

Uncle Michael has been attacked by typhoid fever; his condition is serious. Thursday I leave for Corfu. I will try to keep you advised

[1] Some statements of a personal nature here follow.
[2] The end of the dispatch is missing.

by way of Athens. In case of misfortune what are we going to do as to the election at Corfu? [1]

Yesterday and the day before yesterday, apart from your three dispatches for His Majesty the King, we received three other radio-telegrams with a W preceded by a number, as address. Some of them are illegible. Are these telegrams sent by you or not? Change the address by putting three A's.

THEOTOKY.

No. 59

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legation at Rome.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *November 1/14, 1916.*

Please send by mail the following dispatch to our Minister Resident at Berne, in order that it may be telegraphed to Mr. Theotoky.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Mr. G. Christaki-Zographos, Associate-Governor of the National Bank of Greece, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Please transmit to the Bleichrœder Bank the following dispatch of the National Bank of Greece: "I have received your letter of July 18. I beg you, debiting our account, to place at our disposal at the best rates the equivalent of ten million marks, in dollars, in a first-class Bank of your choice in New York, indicating to us the name of the Bank through the Legation as intermediary."

ZOGRAPHOS.

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

We are all three well. We do not write to you fearing the seizure of our letters. Yours devotedly.

THEOTOKY.

[1] There follow some phrases of a personal nature.

No. 60

Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ATA to Station XM)

ATHENS, *November 21/December 4, 1916.*

The dispatches which will follow will be sent to you without address with two R's and you will send us the replies with two Z's. The last part of the dispatch of yesterday [1] is for the Military Attaché of Sofia and not of Constantinople. Find out where the German Military Attaché of Athens is. We are all well.

THEOTOKY.

No. 61

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Z. (Z.) [2] at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ... to Station ...)

BERLIN, *November 23/December 6, 1916.*

For Her Majesty the Queen:

The German Military Attaché returned yesterday evening from the headquarters where he saw the Emperor and explained to him the situation; he carried away from the interview very good impressions. He will leave in ten days for western Macedonia, near Lake Prespa, in order to be able to reëstablish communication. It is necessary to advise Metaxas and Manos to develop, as soon as possible, the question of the bands. Falkenhausen has been assured of aid and support in this matter on the part of the Grand General Staff. Falkenhausen is going tomorrow to C (?).

THEOTOKY.

For Mr. Sp. Lambros,

President of the Council of Ministers:

Your telegram has been received and communicated to Vienna, Con-

[1] This dispatch is missing.
[2] See radiotelegram No. 60.

stantinople and Sofia. [Mr. Zimmermann] is much pleased with the turn which events are taking in our country. He thinks that the safety of Greece and of the dynasty rests at present where ..... [illegible words] gained the first rubber, in firmness on our part. Any concession of ours at this time will encourage the Entente to increase its claims and demands.

THEOTOKY.

For Mr. J. Theotoky,

Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

Your letter has been received. Please reply by telegraph if the news that Dousmanis and Metaxas have been reinstated is exact. The advance, for the reasons which have been explained, cannot be paid to a neutral bank. Greetings to all three.

THEOTOKY.

No. 62

Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ATA to Station XM)

ATHENS, *November 23/December 6, 1916.*

Your dispatch of yesterday has been received.[1] Her Majesty the Queen begs you to translate into German the following telegram and to communicate it to His Majesty the Emperor, to [the Princess M (?)] and to Falkenhausen:

"By a miracle we are safe after a three-hours' bombardment of the Palace by the French fleet, which fired without warning. The shells exploded very near us. We took refuge in the cellars. Serious engagements also took place next day in the streets; the revolutionaries fired from the houses. The army and the people fought in a magnificent manner [on the previous day] and behaved loyally. The page has been turned. It was a great victory against four Great Powers, whose troops fled before the Greeks and who later retreated under the escort of Greek troops. The Mayor has been imprisoned. Many arrests have been made. The panic has subsided. The garrison has

[1] See document No. 61.

been reinforced to ten regiments. Great excitement! What will the demands of the Entente be? The health of all is good; great nervous tension. We are prepared for everything. We are informed that the note has arrived and that they will demand the reëstablishment of the control and the free passage of the Allied troops. Please inform us when the army in Macedonia will be sufficiently reinforced in order to undertake the definite offensive. Many greetings. I think of you."

SOPHIE.

Tell Falkenhausen that as the control has been got rid of he can communicate through you with us. Before his departure for Macedonia, let him tell us his whereabouts. As for Dousmanis and Metaxas, the news is inexact. If the situation demands it, they will be restored.

THEOTOKY.

No. 63

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *November 24/December 7, 1916.*

Yesterday's dispatch [1] has been received and communicated.

For His Majesty the King:

Field Marshal Hindenburg begs me to telegraph to Your Majesty as follows: "According to positive information, the Entente expects [illegible words] in order that [illegible words] transports to Itea, in order to [illegible words] afterwards the Larissa railway."

THEOTOKY.

[1] See document No. 62.

No. 64

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legation of Greece at Rome.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *November 30/December 13, 1916.*

Please transmit by mail the following dispatch to our Minister at Berne.

ZALOCOSTAS.

His Majesty King Constantine to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

According to reliable information, the Entente will present to us an ultimatum within two days by which it will demand the partial evacuation of Thessaly by our troops and apologies.

CONSTANTINE.

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky,

Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

We can receive, not send, radiotelegrams. Therefore, make use of them.

THEOTOKY.

No. 65

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legation at Rome.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 2/15, 1916.*

Please transmit by mail the following dispatch to our Minister at Berne:

"Please have following dispatch sent to the Minister of the King at Berlin."

ZALOCOSTAS.

To Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin:

The dispatch to Her Majesty the Queen is illegible. Please repeat it by wireless. It is unnecessary to sign your dispatches.

No. 66

Dispatch of His Majesty Emperor William to Her Majesty Queen Sophie, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station OSM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 3/16, 1916.*

I am deeply grateful to you for your dispatch, which I have read with profound emotion. I have seen the dangers through which you and Tino have passed and I admire the courage with which you have resisted during these difficult moments. I have also noticed with pleasure the loyal attitude of the army and navy and their fidelity to their Royal Family. God grant that at last you may be delivered from your horrible situation.

The Entente has again clearly shown what its aim is. There is therefore, naturally, no other course open to Tino but to revolt openly against his executioners. The intervention of Tino with his principal forces operating against the west wing of Sarrail will bring the decision in Macedonia. [Illegible words.] The operations in Rumania have been crowned with the capture of Bucharest. Much has thereby been gained. Up to the present God has helped. He will also be with you in the future and will help you too. Hearty greeting and best wishes. I am thinking constantly of you and Tino.

WILLIAM.

P.S. of Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin for M. (?):

Falkenhausen was here on the 7th. The letter has been received. Heartiest thanks. It is a great comfort. All are well.

For Mr. J. Theotoky,

Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

I have received no news since the 7th. What does it mean? Please reply by telegram.

THEOTOKY.

No. 67

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legation at Rome.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 4/17, 1916.*

Please send to Berne by mail the following telegram for Mr. Theotoky.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Telegram of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece in Berlin.

Tell Falkenhausen to proceed to Pogradez in order to give the necessary impetus to the question of the bands and please send word at once by telegram of the date of his arrival there. Caravitis will receive instructions; he will go to Falkenhausen in order to come to an understanding as to the operations. It will be necessary to have, to begin with, five thousand rifles and three hundred cartridges for each rifle, six machine-guns and [eleven] mountain guns with ammunition, and 500 thousand francs a month for five thousand men. All this ought to be available at Pogradez, as well as provisions. An action by regular forces in the district of Korytza would give strong support to the development of the bands.

I have not written to you because, upon the seizure of our letters by the English, I ceased to write. All well. Yours,

THEOTOKY.

No. 68

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legation of Greece at Rome and to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 7/20, 1916.*

Please transmit at once the following telegram to the Royal Legation at Berlin, notifying us of its receipt.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

The wireless station of Sofia called Athens towards midnight of the 18th-19th of December. Athens, for well-known reasons, cannot reply. Therefore please order Sofia to send dispatches without awaiting a notification from the station at Athens, which is always prepared to receive messages.

Inform the Commander of the Macedonian front that we can establish in the district farthest north in Thessaly a wireless station, which will only operate in case of necessity. The radius of its action is 200 kilometers. Its initials are R. S. P. Let the Commander inform us whether there is a station within this radius of action and what are its initials as well as other technical points.

THEOTOKY.

No. 69

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Z. Z.[1] *at Athens.*

(Radiotelegram)
(Station OSM to ATA)

BERLIN, *December 10/23, 1916.*

Repetition of the dispatch of the fifteenth.[2]

For Her Majesty the Queen:

"Falkenhausen is still in Berlin; he is awaiting the decisions which shall be taken at Athens. In case of neutrality he will proceed to Pogradez; in case of rupture with the Entente, by aeroplane to Larissa. In any case, it is of the utmost importance to develop at once the question of the bands of Caravitis as well as the questions thereto related. Please inform us immediately what is the aid in munitions, money and provisions that You desire. The object of Caravitis should be to cut the Monastir-Salonika railway and to harass Sarrail's rear. One should not lose sight of the fact that even this unofficial action by bands will powerfully help Greece, during the peace negotiations, to advance territorial claims. These claims, naturally, could be more considerable in case of action than in case of simple neutrality.

[1] See radiotelegram No 60.

[2] This dispatch, which is missing, must, nevertheless, have reached its destination, for a reply was sent on the 4/17 of December. See telegram No. 67.

Falkenhausen is awaiting instructions according to which he will act immediately. Please answer at once."

P.S. of Mr. N. Theotoky for the National Bank of Greece:

Mr. Bleichrœder informs me that much to his regret and notwithstanding all his efforts, it has not been possible, for technical reasons, to have the National Bank credited at a New York bank with countervalue for the ten million marks, exchange being too much restricted.[1]

THEOTOKY.

No. 70

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 10/23, 1916.*

Please transmit to the Minister of the King at Berlin the following dispatch, begging him to acknowledge receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Your dispatches have been received including the last one which speaks of peace.[2] The dispatch of Her Majesty the Queen, in reply to the dispatch of the Emperor, was sent to you via Rome on the 18th.[3]

We are expecting a new note from the Entente. The external situation is indefinite.

Please reply by telegraph in regard to the declarations of Mr. (von Bethmann-Hollweg) on Greece.

In order that we may understand each other as to the dispatches sent, the last group will be the number of the dispatch.

Wishing you a Merry Christmas and hoping that the New Year will be happier.

THEOTOKY, No. 300.

[1] See telegram No. 59.
[2] This dispatch is missing.
[3] See repetition of this dispatch in No. 71.

No. 71

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 13/26, 1916.*

Please transmit to the Minister at Berlin the following dispatch and beg him to acknowledge receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Dispatch 190 has been received. Repetition of the dispatch of the 18th follows:

"Please communicate the following telegram of Her Majesty the Queen, after translating it into German, to His Majesty the Emperor and make it also known to [Princess M (?)] and to Falkenhausen:

"I seize today, with warm devotion to you, the opportunity to send you my very best Christmas and New Year greetings from a far distant and isolated land. Hearty thanks for your long and comforting telegram.

"The situation is not as yet cleared and there is continual tension and excitement. The Allies continually support the insurgents and urge them to take possession of parts of the Kingdom which, owing to their proximity to the sea, cannot be defended by us; thus they have occupied by force the Cyclades. Further, by a strict blockade, they are trying to rouse the people against us and to convince them that the evils of a war against the Central Empires would be less hard than the empire of violence, of hunger and of terror that the Allies and the insurgents are imposing upon them. The issue that you advise would be the only one possible if Sarrail, attacked by you, should be obliged to retreat, in which case his left wing would penetrate close to the parts of Greece occupied by us. As things are now, since the distance separating this wing from us is very great, the line of our communications would be too much exposed and our stocks of food and munitions would not be sufficient for the long struggle. Under these circumstances, a decisive and prompt attack [on your] part, if it is

possible, would give to Greece, militarily, the opportunity to intervene and would mean for us the deliverance from the horrible situation in which we are.

"A thousand greetings. Affectionately,

SOPHIE."

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky for Mr. N. Theotoky:

We all send hearty good wishes for your fête.

THEOTOKY.

No. 72

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Z. (Z.)[1] *at Athens.*

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 13/26, 1916.*

Dispatch of First Quartermaster General Ludendorff to His Majesty King Constantine:

"Since the [illegible words] of the proposition of peace, our situation in Rumania has been further improved. Although we are ready to enter into peace parleys, we are continuing the war with all our means."

THEOTOKY.

No. 73

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 18/31, 1916.*

Please transmit the following telegram under No. 556 (?) to the Minister of the King at Berlin, begging him to acknowledge receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Telegram of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

The blockade continues. We have bread enough to last until the end of the month of December.

[1] See radiotelegram No. 60.

The note of the Entente was presented to us today. It includes: (1) Withdrawal of the troops from Thessaly and the Island of Eubœa, leaving troops necessary for the maintenance of order. (2) The troops in Thessaly and Continental Greece must be left without artillery and machine-guns. (3) Reëstablishment of the control; modification in particular of the control over the movements of troops. (4) Surrender to the Entente of the arrested Venizelists. (5) Apology on the part of the Royal Government and replacement of the General Commanding the First Army Corps.

It is absolutely necessary that we should know whether or not the offensive action on the Macedonian front will begin, and when, in order that we may arrange our plans accordingly.

Please answer by telegraph whether you have received telegram 18 of Her Majesty the Queen.[1] The telegram of the [First] Quartermaster General [Ludendorff] has been received.[2]

THEOTOKY, No. 301.

No. 74

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 19/January 1, 1917.*

Please transmit the following telegram under No. 663 (?) to the Minister at Berlin, acknowledging receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of their Majesties King Constantine and Queen Sophie to His Majesty Emperor William.

We extend our warmest wishes for the Year Year. May God give new victories and peace.

The situation is very serious; there is bread for only fourteen days. The note is impertinent; they wish to starve us to death and by continuing the blockade to impose their demands. Without food-supplies the situation is desperate.

[1] See repetition of this telegram in No. 71.
[2] See radiotelegram No. 72.

We congratulate you for the magnificent victories in Rumania and affectionately greet you.

TINO,
SOPHIE.

P.S. for Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin:

Please communicate this dispatch also to Princess M. (?) and to Falkenhausen and tell him that we have sent the courier by land and are awaiting reply. No. [302].

No. 75

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 20, 1916/January 2, 1917.*

Please transmit the following telegram under No. 5391 to the Minister at Berlin, acknowledging receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Telegram of Her Majesty Queen Sophie to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

For Falkenhausen:

Owing to the continuation of the blockade we have bread for only a few days; other food-supplies too are diminishing. War against the Entente is therefore now out of the question. Negotiations as to the note are under way. I consider the game as lost, if the attack does not take place immediately; it will be too late afterwards.

SOPHIE, No. 303.

No. 76

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 24, 1916/January 6, 1917.*

Please transmit to the Minister at Berlin the following dispatch.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of His Majesty King Constantine to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Please communicate to Field Marshal von Hindenburg that his request of December 8 for information on the military situation was received by courier only on the 4th of January.

The military situation of Greece is weakened on account of the well-known facts and the prolongation of the agonizing situation in which we have been held for more than a year [by] the successive demands and pressure of the Entente, against which the State and the people have been obliged [illegible words] opposing a desperate resistance with incalculable losses. In any case, the occupation by foreign armies of Macedonia and of nearly all the islands has resulted in a great decrease of the military forces. Recently Greece [illegible words] of an ultimatum and a strict blockade, which, notwithstanding the admirable moral and material resistance of the people, has commenced to have a grievous influence, for deaths from starvation have already taken place in certain places.

Greece, being isolated under this pressure of the Entente and [illegible words] allies, has been unavoidably compelled to transport a great part of her army to the Peloponnesus. The forces which are now in Continental Greece may, if mobilized, amount to four divisions of three regiments each, with one independent brigade in Eastern Greece, and approximately two divisions in Epirus; but these latter with insignificant forces of artillery. Of the four divisions of Eastern Greece two at least are necessary for the defense of the capital and the eastern coasts with its one railway, and nearly two and a half, without artillery, may be available to act in Thessaly and in Western Macedonia. The transportation of the two divisions through Epirus to Eastern Greece is very difficult. Moreover, it must be taken into

account that because of the blockade there exist very scanty stores of food-supplies and that there is a total lack of gasoline and a minimum of coal.

One must also take into serious consideration that with things as they are now, it is probable that the declaration of war will come before the mobilization, and that probably the Entente desires to push Greece to an immediate war in order to crush her before the German occupation begins. Already Greece is confronted by a new note of the Entente which demands her complete disarmament and the transportation of all the artillery and of all mobilization material to the Peloponnesus, and this note is enforced by the continuation of the blockade. The Royal Government and the people resist with firmness, enduring all the privations, but the situation is getting worse from day to day.

It is desirable that we should be informed at once whether a German attack on the Macedonian front is in prospect and when it will probably begin.

KING CONSTANTINE.

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie:

A wireless station with initials RSP, radius 200 kilometers, has been established near Kalabaka in Thessaly. Please acknowledge receipt of the present telegram, as well as of the dispatches Nos. 301, 302, 303, 304, 305,[1] forwarded by way of Berne.

Please thank for Her Majesty the Queen [von Bethmann-Hollweg].

THEOTOKY.

Where is Falkenhausen? We have not yet received news from him. No. 306.

[1] See the first three of these dispatches under Nos. 73, 74 and 75. The two others are missing.

No. 77

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 27/January 9, 1917.*

Please transmit this telegram to the Minister at Berlin, acknowledging receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Telegram of Her Majesty Queen Sophie to His Majesty Emperor William.

I thank you heartily for your telegram, but lacking sufficient food-supplies for the duration of such an enterprise, as well as munitions and many other things, we are unfortunately compelled to abstain from such an offensive. You can realize my situation! How much I suffer! I thank you from my heart for your loving words, for the [illegible words] of the abominable circumstances. May the infamous pigs receive the punishment which they deserve! I embrace you affectionately. Your isolated and afflicted sister, who hopes for better times.

SOPHIE.

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin:

Yesterday evening, Monday, an ultimatum [with] a forty-eight [hour] limit was presented to us. It demands the acceptance of the note of December 31st. Guarantees are given that the extension of the revolutionary movement will not be permitted. In view of the military situation and your last dispatch as to the reply of Field Marshal von Hindenburg, and after meetings of the Ministerial and Crown Council, it was decided that the ultimatum would be accepted in principle. May God preserve us, after this acceptance, against new demands and may He preserve the King and the Country.

THEOTOKY.

Have you received dispatch No. 322 (?)? Number of the present: 308.

No. 78

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Z. (Z.)[1] *at Athens.*

(Radiotelegram)
(Station XM to Station ATA)

BERLIN, *December 27, 1916/January 9, 1917.*

(1) A station at Prilep with initials WF, or LR, or MV, radius of action 700 (in case of necessity one thousand), will from the first of January be at the disposal of our station RSP,[2] every day, from 6 to 7 o'clock A.M., East Europe Time. As soon as RSP opens communication, Prilep will also be ready to receive, between 2 to 3 and 7 to 8 o'clock P.M.

(2) In order to hide the sendings from Nauen (initials POZ), Sofia (FF, and not any longer XM), and Constantinople (OSM) for Athens from tomorrow, December 28, the calls which are meant for Athens will be addressed from POZ to OSM, from FF to OSM (from OSM) to FF. The stations called will respond, this being done in order to dupe. Athens should always listen in and record.

(3) The German War Department may send by aeroplane the material and the personnel for a wireless station, of rather large radius, to Northern Thessaly. Please telegraph immediately if this dispatch of such material, etc., is desirable.

(4) Falkenhausen will be at Prespa on the 29th.

(5) Please acknowledge receipt of present.

THEOTOKY, No. 192.

[1] See radiotelegram No. 60.
[2] See radiotelegrams Nos. 68 and 76.

No. 79

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 28, 1916/January 10, 1917.*

Please transmit the following dispatch to our Minister at Berlin and beg him to acknowledge receipt of same.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Please communicate the following dispatch of Her Majesty the Queen to His Majesty the Emperor and also make contents known to Princess M. (?) and to Falkenhausen: (?)

"I am grateful and happy for having at least spoken today by telephone with Falkenhausen at Larissa and also for having heard directly from you.

"I am [illegible words] that the ultimatum was accepted, but, unfortunately, we were obliged to accept, although we desired war on the side of Germany both on account of the political advantages and on account of our need to get rid of our infuriated enemies and also in order to respond to the sympathy which has been already shown by the Hellenic people for the German cause. But the want of food-supplies, and of munitions sufficient for the duration of the campaign and particularly the want of heavy artillery in order to [illegible words] the fortified and prepared positions of our enemies in the narrow passes to the north of Thessaly and [the menace] that might come at any moment to the capital and to our only way of communication through the English forces reported at Malta as ready for the expedition against Greece, compelled us, with great regret, to renounce this project.

"I hope that you will not lose sight of the fact that Greece, in pursuit of our plans, if united by railway, could, on account of her geographical position, become a useful and precious aid to our beloved Fatherland. Among the people we shall always continue to work in favor of Germany against our enemies; you can be positively sure of this and I am proud that the indescribable sufferings and

anxieties which we have undergone and continue to undergo for the maintenance of neutrality have enabled us to render important services. Affectionately.

SOPHIE."

P.S. for Mr. N. Theotoky:

"It is important that you, too, [illegible words] should use your influence with Zimmermann, along the lines suggested by this dispatch, for the sake of our relations during and after the war.

SOPHIE."

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky:

All the dispatches have been received, except No. 195.[1] I hope that the New Year will be happier.

THEOTOKY, No. 309.

No. 80

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Z. (Z.)[2] at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station OSM to Station FF)

BERLIN, *December 30, 1916/January 12, 1917.*

I repeat dispatch No. 108 and acknowledge receipt of dispatches Nos. 301, 302, 303.[3]

"I have seen Mr. Zimmermann and have insisted that the attack should begin as soon as possible, telling him that we desire finally [to know] clearly whether this offensive will take place. He replied that personally he was in favor of this offensive, but that all depended on Field Marshal von Hindenburg to whom he had referred the matter. If the reply is dilatory, I think that we ought to act according to our own interests, without taking into account any other considerations, in view of the fact that we have already made sacrifices enough and cannot ruin the dynasty and the country for the beautiful eyes [illegible words]."

THEOTOKY.

[1] There follows a remark of a personal nature.
[2] See radiotelegram No. 60.
[3] See dispatches Nos. 73, 74 and 75.

No. 81

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Z. (Z.) [1] *at Athens.*

(Radiotelegram)
(Station OSM to Station FF)

BERLIN, *December 30, 1916/January 12, 1917.*

In reply to your dispatch No. 308,[2] I have the honor to inform you that the Minister of Foreign Affairs to whom I have announced this morning the decision taken by the Crown Council, was quite disappointed. I did not fail to call to his attention that, according to my opinion, if the reply of Field Marshal von Hindenburg had been more attractive and categorical, very probably the Crown Council would have decided for action.

Are they going to introduce control of the telegraphic service?

Personal:

After the acceptance of the note and the abstaining from action, I think that, for some time at least, there will be no negotiations between Athens and Berlin, so that I can make use of my leave of absence. Please telegraph to me your [?] and that of His Majesty the King. In case of an affirmative, please come to an understanding with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in order that I may obtain from the Entente [illegible words] assurances for a free passage through Italy, going and coming, for myself, H. (?) and a maid. No. [202.]

THEOTOKY.

No. 82

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 31, 1916/January 13, 1917.*

Please transmit the following dispatch to our Minister at Berlin, begging him to acknowledge receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

[1] See radiotelegram No. 60.
[2] See this dispatch under No. 77.

Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Please inform me if Falkenhausen has received two dispatches sent by our Station RSP at Prilep.

His Majesty the King was much pleased with your dispatches under Nos. 202 [1] and 203 [2] and told me that you had always seen the situation clearly. As for the leave of absence, he approves, in principle, that you should make use of it, but he fears the difficulties of the trip and particularly the contingency that you may not be permitted to return. He will answer definitely after having conferred with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. My opinion is, that in order to avoid all these difficulties and dangers, you should continue to stay there and come in the spring if it is then possible.

THEOTOKY.

Dispatch of Her Majesty Queen Sophie for Falkenhausen.

Mr. Zimmermann personally was in favor of the offensive, but it was only upon agreement with Field Marshal von Hindenburg that the decision could be taken. Had the reply of Field Marshal von Hindenburg been more favorable and categorical, the Crown Council would have decided for the attack. I am heart-broken! It is too, too bad! They have blundered! Cerigo has been occupied by the insurgents; other [surprises] will probably follow. Greetings.

SOPHIE.

P.S. of Mr. J. Theotoky for Mr. N. Theotoky:

As to the control, there is nothing definite as yet. I think that they will not extend it to the telegraph service. The dispatch for Falkenhausen [contains] the opinions of the Queen.

THEOTOKY, No. 311.

[1] See this dispatch under No. 81.
[2] This dispatch is missing.

No. 83

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *January 1/14, 1917.*

Please transmit the following dispatch to our Minister at Berlin, requesting him to acknowledge receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of S. (?) to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

For Falkenhausen:

In case the courier should arrive late at P. (?), at latest on Saturday, January 20th, I beg you to wait for him. It is of the utmost importance that you should personally speak to the bearer, Franghiscos, an officer of the Reserves, for the organization of the bands in future.

Our Naval Attaché informs us from London: "By successive direct notes or through the medium of the United States [illegible words] to communicate mutually [their] points of view and thus bring about a conference. This will take some time. The British Imperial Congress, without the advice of which they would not enter into final parleys, will meet at the end of February. People here are preoccupied with the extra-parliamentary agitations of the French Socialist group, which desires [illegible words] peace, as well as Italy." Greetings.

S. (?), No. 312.

No. 84

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty King Constantine, at Athens.

(Radiotelegram)
(Station ... to Station ...)

BERLIN, *January 5/18, 1917.*

Von Hindenburg informs me, that according to Falkenhausen's information, the Entente, notwithstanding our acceptance of the ulti-

matum, intends to demand from us the delivery to them of our artillery and war material. The German General Staff, which regards it as extremely important that this demand, if made, should not be complied with, desires to know if Greece would be ready, in case of necessity, to destroy the artillery and the material. In case of an affirmative answer, the Imperial Government would bind itself to compensate us. The General Staff begs You, in case its proposition should be accepted by Your Majesty, to give them a detailed statement of the artillery and other material which would have to be destroyed and later replaced.

THEOTOKY.

P.S. for [S. (?) and Mr. J. Theotoky]:

I have had the honor to receive your dispatches Nos. 311 and 312.[1] Is the news communicated by Falkenhausen that we have destroyed the station RSP exact?

I spent New Year's day among our troops. It is indispensable that His Majesty the King should reply, in a word or two, to the dispatch of the Army Corps. Do your best that this reply may reach me as soon as possible.

THEOTOKY.

No. 85

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *January 6/19, 1917.*

Please transmit the following telegram in cipher to the Minister of the King at Berlin, begging him to acknowledge receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

I have received your dispatch No. 1. Station RSP has been demolished for fear that its dismantling would be demanded by the Entente. It has been transported to Trikkala and in case of necessity it will be again set up. We can continue to communicate just as up to the present.

[1] See these dispatches under Nos. 82 and 83.

Their Majesties thank both of you very sincerely for your wishes.

The dispatch with congratulations for the Army Corps was sent two days ago, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as suggested in your dispatch No. 1. His Majesty the King, in all probability, will receive under little [illegible words]. Mr. Naoum informs me confidentially that the attack on the Macedonian front will be made as soon as the campaign in Rumania is finished. Do you also know anything about it? Affectionately.

THEOTOKY.

P.S. of S. (?) for Falkenhausen:

The allies could make no use of aeroplanes during these days on account of breakage. They are trying to increase the Macedonian army to 800,000 men and are sending reinforcements in great haste. The new courier will leave on Saturday.

S. (?), No. 1.

No. 86

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *January 7/20, 1917.*

Please transmit the following dispatch, as soon as possible, to our Minister at Berlin.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Please communicate the following reply to von Hindenburg:

"His Majesty the King thanks Field Marshal von Hindenburg for his proposition, which he accepts.[1] The following measures will be taken, in order that the material may not fall into the hands of the Entente: 1st, The proper storage of the war material. 2nd, Resistance of any eventual attempt of the Entente to take possession of the material by force. 3rd, Destruction of the material in case of necessity, in which case the material will be replaced by Germany.

List of the material concentrated in the Peloponnesus:

[1] See radiotelegram No. 84.

Field artillery, all rapid firing: 153 Schneider guns of 7.5; 29 Krupp guns of 7.5, two Schneider howitzers of 12. Mountain guns, all rapid firing: 85 Schneider guns of 7.5 and 19 Krupp guns of 7.5. Machine-guns: 145 Swiss Schwarzlose of 5 (?) m/m and 66 Maxim of 7.65 m/m. Rifles: 85,000 Manlicher rifles of 6.5; 50,000 Mauser rifles of 7.65. Infantry ammunition: 100 million Manlicher cartridges of 6.5; 25 million Mauser cartridges of 7.65; 165,000 shells and explosives for Schneider guns of 7.5 for mountain artillery; 2,500 shells and explosives for Krupp guns of 7.5 for mountain artillery."

THEOTOKY.

We have been informed that the Governor of Smyrna has been bribed by the Entente to surrender the city of Smyrna, after a feigned riot.

Number of the present dispatch: 2.

No. 87

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *January 13/26, 1917.*

Please transmit the following dispatch to the Minister of the King at Berlin, acknowledging receipt of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Their Majesties King Constantine and Queen Sophie to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Please communicate the following dispatch, translated into German, to His Majesty the Emperor:

"We send you from the bottom of our heart our cordial wishes for Your birthday. We follow with admiration the great events by land and sea. May God soon give you a glorious victory over all Your infamous enemies! They have honored us by the landing of forty Senegalese soldiers, in order to guard the Legation of France. A charming picture of civilization! Affectionate greetings.

TINO. SOPHIE."

P.S. of Mr. Th. Ypsilanti, 1st Equerry of the King:

Madame Ypsilanti will soon arrive in Austria. Please let her know that we are all well here. YPSILANTI, No. 3.

No. 88

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Minister Resident of Greece at Berne.

No. 112.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *January 27/February 9, 1917.*

Please transmit the following telegram to Mr. Theotoky and acknowledge receipt of some.

ZALOCOSTAS.

Dispatch of Mr. J. Theotoky, Master of Ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

Why this prolonged silence? We are always without news from you.

THEOTOKY.

Dispatch of Her Majesty Queen Sophie for (Princess M. (?)):

I hope that your health is good and that the measure of the blockade will have full success. Here everything is as usual. Greetings.

SOPHIE.

P.S. of S. (?) for Falkenhausen:

I am quiet and reassured, having received news indirectly concerning you, as well as by courier. Greetings.

S. (?), No. 5.

APPENDIX

No. 89

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at Athens.

(Telegram)

SOFIA, *September 8/21, 1915.*

I have the honor to inform you that the liberal deputies of the Parliamentary majority held a meeting yesterday at the Sobranje. The President of the Council explained the political situation, paying

particular attention to the relations with the neighboring states. The Deputies entirely approved the policy of the President of the Council.

Today the Parliamentary majority, composed of liberal Deputies, Young Liberals and Stamboulovists, will hold a meeting under the presidency of Mr. Radoslavoff.

According to the local papers "Outro" and "La Poste des Balkans," in yesterday's meeting, the President of the Council made the following declarations, which, in view of the existing censorship, I have every reason to believe exact:

The President of the Council declared first, that the Bulgaro-Turkish agreement had been concluded; he indicated the new Turkish frontiers, as shown in one of my previous dispatches. He added that the Bulgarian State thus gained about 3,000 square kilometers of territory and that he will proceed to the purchase of the Dedeagatch railway line.

The President of the Council afterwards said that in future Bulgaria would follow, like Switzerland, a policy of armed neutrality, since the theater of the war was approaching the Bulgarian frontiers. He assured me that on the 6th of September the Austro-German armies had commenced their attack against Serbia and that the position of Bulgaria was assured both by the Entente and the Alliance. If worse came to worst, he added, Bulgaria had nothing to lose, but in case of success, Bulgaria would have the non-contested zone and the contested zone and would extend its boundaries to the south, the east, the north and the west.

The President of the Council affirmed that the relations with Rumania were good, although negotiations had not been entered into by the two States, and he added that, the difficulties between Rumania and the Central Powers having been settled, Rumania would preserve her neutrality without interesting herself in the Austro-German attack upon Serbia.

He afterwards said that Greece would follow a policy of neutrality, that she had made declarations to this effect to Austria and Germany and that she would take no interest in the Austro-German attack upon Serbia. If Greece attacked Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Government would take its measures in order to emerge successfully from a Greco-Bulgarian war. I call your attention to these last statements, published in the morning papers notwithstanding the censorship; they have not been denied by the official papers of this evening.

As to Serbia, the President of the Council observed that she would only cede the territories up to the Vardar at the end of the war and that the Serbian Government had given them to understand that it would prefer to enter into a war with Bulgaria rather than to lose her common frontier with Greece.

NAOUM.

No. 90

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. J. Gryparis, Minister of Greece at Vienna.

(Telegram—Translation)

BERLIN, *January 8/21, 1916.*

Official circles here are very well satisfied with the attitude of Bulgaria toward us, the Emperor of Germany having brought away from an interview with the King of Bulgaria the certainty that both the King of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Government are animated by really sincere intentions as to the regulation of the relations between Greece and Bulgaria.

THEOTOKY.

No. 91

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens.[1]

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *March 21/April 3, 1916.*

I have the honor to inform you that exact information as to the attitude of the King of Bulgaria, on the occasion of his visit to German Army Headquarters, as well as at Vienna, do not in the least correspond with the information furnished by the Hellenic Legation at Vienna, in regard to the claims formulated by the King of Bulgaria on Albania, Greek Macedonia and Dobrudja.

In regard to Albania, the King of Bulgaria has put forth claims

[1] This telegram was communicated by Mr. Skouloudis to the Royal Legations at Vienna and Sofia.

to the Albanian towns ceded to Serbia by the Conference of London, but he has not put forth any claims to the Albanian cities of the Adriatic. In regard to the allotment of Greek territories, no such demand has ever been made and, for reasons of general policy, it would never have been accepted by the Central Powers, in view of the fact that, as the Royal Government knows by my telegraphic correspondence of the years 1914 and 1915, the Central Empires have always made it a principle to declare to Bulgaria, even before she became their ally, that they would never consent to discuss the possibility of compensations made at the expense of Greece. This principle, immutable since the beginning of the European war, prevailed even at the moment when the alliance was concluded between the said Empires and Bulgaria, and the latter admits this. To say that Bulgaria is at present formulating claims at the expense of Greece would be to fail to understand a political situation existing for nearly two years. It was the Triple Entente that spoke to the Bulgarians, before the break came, of compensations at the expense of Greece. The same principle prevailed with regard to Rumania.

It is, however, correct that there has been, during these last weeks, some friction between Bulgaria and Austria, but this arose from discussion of the respective military occupation of the Serbian and the Serbo-Macedonian territories.

In regard to the appointment of the future King of Albania, Austria has no thought either of Prince Cyril of Bulgaria or of Prince Wied.

THEOTOKY.

No. 92

Mr. J. Gryparis, Minister of Greece in Vienna, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Athens.

(Telegram—Translation)

VIENNA, *March 29/April 11, 1916.*

I have had the honor of receiving your telegraphic dispatch, in which you communicated to me a telegram of our Legation at Berlin [1] which, on the basis, so it says, of positive information, affirms that the

[1] See this telegram under No. 91.

news transmitted by the Vienna Legation, as to the claims formulated by the King of Bulgaria during his stay at Vienna, is baseless.

I have considered and consider the news transmitted to the Ministry in my telegraphic dispatches, and particularly in those of the 23rd and 24th of February and of the 4th of March of the current year as all the better founded, inasmuch as I received them from impartial persons, connected with Government and Court circles, and enjoying the confidence of both, and furthermore, because they confirmed the information of Mr. Naoum, contained in his telegram transmitted to the Legation in the telegram of the Ministry under date of November 6, 1915.

Mr. Naoum there says, in regard to Bulgarian aims as to Hellenic territories, that "the Bulgarians, taking advantage of the services rendered to the Central Empires, have in view the realization, along the whole line, of their national aspirations, through the acquisition of the territories of their neighbors to which they lay claim, and that it is more than probable that the friendly declarations of Bulgaria in regard to Greece will give place, on the first occasion, as soon as all danger on the part of Greece has disappeared, to hostile dispositions."

My information, is, besides, corroborated by that of our Legation at Petrograd, transmitted to me in your telegram of January 5, and also by the incidents which, notwithstanding the promises repeatedly given by the Bulgarians, keep occurring again and again.

But, although I consider my information exact, I do not contest the right of the Berlin Legation to charge them with being inexact, since they do not agree with its own.

But the Berlin Legation goes further yet; it considers it impossible that Bulgaria could have laid claim to Hellenic territories, because she had accepted the declarations of the Central Empires, according to which the latter would never consent to compensations at the expense of Greece, and thinks, furthermore, that to say that Bulgaria puts forth such claims "would be to fail to understand a political situation which has existed for nearly two years."

Though I respect the opinions of others, I think it my duty to close the discussion with the declaration that I maintain my opinions unchangeable, as expressed in many telegrams, and particularly in that of the 21st of March of the current year.

GRYPARIS.

No. 93

Mr. J. Gryparis, Minister of Greece in Vienna, to Mr. A. Carapanos, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Athens.

(Telegram—Translation)

ATHENS, *September 11/24, 1916.*

Concerning the information transmitted with reservations in my telegraphic dispatch of September 9, I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the opinions which, in consequence of long experience, I have formed about the Bulgarians, have been given in various telegrams, particularly in those of December 7 and 8, 1915, and March 4, 21 and 29 of the current year, the latter being a reply to one of the Ministry, in which a telegram of the Berlin Legation was transmitted to me.

I beg Your Excellency to take cognizance of these.

GRYPARIS.

No. 94

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister of Greece at Rome, to His Majesty King Constantine at Athens.

(Telegram)

ROME, *November 25/December 8, 1916.*

I returned to Rome just at the time when the terrible events of the 18th of November were taking place at Athens. In reading the frank dispatches of the Government, which give assurance that it wishes to maintain the best of relations with the Powers of the Entente, I see that it fails to appreciate the frightful gravity of the situation, and to realize the final catastrophe toward which official Greece is bound. The ambiguous and uncertain policy, which Your Governments have followed for more than a year, has led us to turn our arms against our natural friends, that is, against the Powers of the Entente, to whom we have so many times given assurances of our benevolent friendship, while—and this is an unheard-of thing,—this same policy induced us not to resist the Bulgarians, our hereditary enemies, when they came to take our forts, our cities in Macedonia, the half of our war material

and so many of our soldiers! Now that blood has been shed, France and England, to whom we owe our restoration, and who have so often aided us, have become the implacable enemies of Your Majesty and of that part of Greece which has remained under Your laws. They will demand guarantees and reparation, and the punishment will fall first upon the people, who through the blockade already established, will pay, in starvation and misery, for the errors of these last days.

I do not wish to revert to that which I have several times brought to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and of which Your Majesty is fully aware. Our geographical position and our national interests demand that we be the frank and sincere friends of the Entente, in spite of the risks that this may involve. But Your Governments have dreamed that it was possible to remain undecided up to the very end, to wait for events to guide us, fearing all initiative, and hypnotized by the dream of an unrealizable neutrality. We have thus been insincere toward all and toward ourselves, accused of treachery by one and the other of the two belligerents; we have been led finally to treat as enemies the Powers of the Entente, who believed in our sympathy and who have all the means to impose their will upon us by force.

To crown the horror, Greece in the midst of the misfortunes which have thus overwhelmed her, is divided into two camps which have a deadly grudge against each other; hate is in their hearts and civil war is in their souls and in their actions; we kill and assassinate each other, while the Bulgarians are settled on our soil and oppress our brothers. The country is in the greatest distress, it is in a state of anarchy; criminal and atrocious acts have been committed at Athens against the civil population, and the agents of public order have done nothing to stop them.

One part of Greece has repudiated the other, and has torn itself violently away from her; it has broken away from the Government of Athens to go to Salonika in order to defend our soil which we have abandoned to our enemies. I know well that, in spite of this, they tell You, Sire, that the majority of the people is with You; but You should not be the King of the majority, Sire; You should be the King of all the Greeks, without exception, not only of those who live in the Kingdom, but also of those who live in other lands, and those who speak thus to You, in order to console You, depreciate Your Majesty and even weaken Your throne, which they pretend to support, for

majorities melt away, when adversity comes, and the throne cannot be merely a political party.

Never, Sire, has the country been in such a dreadful condition. It is inconceivable that pity should not grip all hearts and make them feel that the fatherland is perishing and that nothing but the union of all her citizens can save her.

I do not wish to revert to what has already happened and to apportion the responsibility for the errors for which each of the two parties blames the other. We must forget the past; yes, Sire, we must forget it, in order to pass to what is more urgent; we must bring about this union and find salvation. This cannot be done without concessions and sacrifices made in order to realize this union; it is he who has the greatest power, it is You, Sire, alone, who can perform the great act of redemption, bring back calm and peace and restore to Greece the strength which has left her.

Listen to the voice of a man who is far removed from all prejudice, passion, and hate, and who trembles only for the fate of his country. I appeal to Your patriotic feeling, and to that love that You feel for our Country.

Whatever the issue of this great conflict may be—and even Your Majesty feels that it will be indecisive—Greece must remain the frank and sincere friend of the Powers of the Entente, and must be the enemy of Bulgaria. Mr. Venizelos and his colleagues at Salonika have seen this truth. Do not refuse, Sire, to see it Yourself. And since You are King, not of the majority of the people, but of all the Greeks, forget the past, forget any grievances that You may have, and ask for the assistance of Mr. Venizelos and his friends; I have the firm hope that they will give it to You freely. Have a strong Government, capable of assuming responsibilities, and capable of relieving You of their burden. Perform this act, Sire; You who have brought glory upon our national arms, save the soul of Greece from the passions which are rending her; save our nation, and our race. Greece, united by You, will be able, no matter what unforeseen blows the war has in store for us, to resist the storm and to avoid the disasters that await her. If You do not do this at once, the future of our Country and of Hellenism will be lamentable and dreadful.

I beg Your Majesty to excuse the frankness of my language. The affection that I bear for You, compels me to speak to You thus, for my heart bleeds when I think what You were and of what is going

to come. It is my duty to speak to You plainly and with no reticence; it is my duty to tell Your Majesty that the policy which has so fatefully brought us to the position, in which, alas! we find ourselves, is a deadly policy, and one of which I fundamentally disapprove. The advice that I venture to give You, and Your Royal act, bringing to pass the union of all, are all that can now save what remains.

COROMILAS.